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Japanese deals are back. During the so-called “lost decade” of the 1990s when
Japanese banks were saddled with non-performing loans and Japanese companies posted
minimal earnings growth, it seemed as if the Japanese economy was left out of the
globalization trend that was sweeping across the Western economies and much of the
developing world. Perhaps lost in the shuffle of the tech boom, the fallout from Enron
and Worldcom, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and the subsequent rules issued by
securities regulators, the investigations of New York Attorney General Spitzer and the
SEC into the recommendations of securities analysts and market timing abuses by certain
mutual funds, on top of the grave concerns raised in a post September 11th world, there
was little time left to discuss the critical changes which were taking place in world’s
second largest economy. Although some companies and investors took another look at
Japan somewhat earlier in the business cycle (and have consequently reaped the benefits
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of such investments), only recently have the numbers come back to generate renewed
interest across the market.
The numbers have come back big. According to Thomson Financial, in 2005 the
total number of Japanese deals was 2,552—second only to the U.S.—resulting in total
deal volume exceeding $167 billion—third in the world following the U.S. and U.K.2
Japanese deals are up 109.2% in 2005 from their 2004 levels, while the U.S. and U.K.
were at 33.3% and 15.6%, respectively. Granted, while Japanese deals may still account
for a smaller percentage of the overall Japanese economy when measured against
comparable figures in many Western economies, there is little doubt that the trends are
up. Indeed, Thomson concluded that “Japan proved a hot market in 2005, far outpacing
growth in the US, UK, and Australia.”3
The reasons for these developments are many, and include the decrease in crossshareholdings between Japanese companies, an increase in shareholder activism as
represented by notable market players, and simple business fundamentals that made
doing a deal much more attractive than may have been the case only a few years earlier.
In addition to these market developments, Japan has experienced tremendous changes to
the legal profession itself, such as the establishment of a law school system modeled on

2
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the U.S. to train the next generation of Japanese attorneys (bengoshi),4 as well as recent
amendments to the Japanese Federation of Bar Association rules which now permit
bengoshi and foreign attorneys to partner up to a certain extent.5 Other notable
developments in the M&A practice in Japan include:
•

An increase in the hostile or contested deal. While still relatively small
compared to the historic activity in the U.S., it is no longer the case that
every deal in Japan must be a friendly one.

•

New defensive measures to combat the hostile bidder. In the aftermath of
the Livedoor hostile bid for Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc., Japanese
boards have actively pursued a variety of defensive measures including the
possible issuance of share purchase warrants (shinkabu-yoyaku-ken) which
can operate in a manner similar to U.S.-style poison pills.6

•

More competition even in the mega-deals. The business opportunities to
do more deals has resulted in increased competition at all levels, which
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art. 2, no. 15; art, 49-3, as amended in 2003.
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warrants are used as defensive measures since in the vernacular of practitioners in Japan there has not
been, at least as of yet, any one label that has gained a strong and devout following. The ambiguity in
commonly used phrases, however, should not blur the crucial differences in law between Japanese
and U.S. “poison pills.”
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has further highlighted the attractiveness of reaching an agreement with
the target while adequately protecting such an agreement. For instance,
the recent merger between UFJ Holdings and Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial
Group for $ 41 billion included the issuance of shares with certain veto
rights as well as a fiduciary-out provision, both of which were firsts in
major Japanese M&A deals.
•

Greater flexibility for cross-border transactions. Amendments to the
Corporation Law which permit the use of certain types of triangular
mergers have recently been enacted. In addition, as a means of keeping
the laws on the books up to speed with the dynamic changes in the market,
the Japanese government has issued new guidelines on M&A defensive
strategies.

All these changes may leave the U.S. legal practitioner somewhat perplexed as to
where to start to learn how to get deals done in the new Japan. A widely shared opinion
is that Japan is currently experiencing an increase in takeover activity that is comparable
to the heyday of U.S. takeovers during the mid to late 1980s, a time which still largely
provides the foundation for present American takeovers jurisprudence.7 Still, while much
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has changed in Japanese law and practice of late, the challenges of doing a cross-border
deal with a Japanese company still remain.
This article examines the process which is currently being played out in Japan by:
(i) analyzing the recent changes in Japanese law of relevance to M&A deals, (ii)
discussing some recent contested deals in Japan that may shed some light on current
market practices, and (iii) providing an overview of the key issues that a U.S. practitioner
will likely face when working on a Japanese deal. While this analysis is by no means an
exhaustive or comprehensive treatment of the subject matter, hopefully it will provide
some insight into the changes that are taking place in Japan while also noting some of the
future developments that may to some degree be anticipated.
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I.

Recent Changes in Japanese Law
A good starting point in better understanding the remarkable changes in the

Japanese M&A markets is to review the recent amendments to Japanese law, certain
policy initiatives by the functional regulators, and other guidelines issued by Japanese
government agencies. When taken as a whole, these reforms are substantial and may
well be the most ambitious and far reaching in a generation. While the specific measures
in these reforms may not have a direct comparison to a particular event in the U.S. legal
experience, one could reasonably characterize the reforms as representing a degree of
change on the same level as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Fortunately for
the U.S. practitioner, however, the Japanese reforms have been drafted with purpose of
facilitating more cross-border deals. Thus, at least in principle, the reforms should not
increase the number of regulatory hurdles that a U.S. company must pass in order to enter
the Japanese market.
A.

Enactment of the New Corporation Law

The most significant of these reforms was the enactment of a new Corporation
Law (kaisha-ho) in June 2005. These reforms largely took effect in May 2006, except for
certain provisions regarding possible cash-out and triangular mergers which are
scheduled to take effect in May 2007. The Corporation Law is the primary source of
Japanese corporate law and may be compared to the Delaware General Corporation Law,
although there are notable differences that must always be considered prior to entering
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into any transaction.8 The vast majority of the changes to the Corporation Law involve
the structuring and governance of Japanese entities, which by and large should not affect
the legal compliance issues for a U.S. corporation. However, where a U.S. corporation
does business with a Japanese entity or perhaps has an interest in a Japanese company as
part of its international operations, the amendments to the Corporation Law will have a
significant impact. Some of the more important changes include:
•

Revision of Japanese corporate structures. The new Corporation Law
adopts a number of important changes to the available corporate structures
including: (i) the introduction of limited liability partnership companies
(godo-kaisha) modeled after LLCs in the U.S.; (ii) abolishment of limited
liability companies typically used by small businesses (yugen-kaisha); and
(iii) expansion of the definition of parent-subsidiary relationships from a
straight majority of the vote test to include cases where the parent has
control of the subsidiary.9

•

Streamlining of Japanese corporate governance rules. The new
Corporation Law also clarifies the applicable governance requirements of
each of these entities. While the primary election for a joint stock

8

For instance, the Corporation Law does not permit cash-out mergers for 90% holders of voting shares
in the absence of a merger agreement with the target company, as is commonly the case in Delaware.
See Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 253.

9

See Kaisha-ho [Corporate Law], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, no. 3 [hereinafter Corporation Law].
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company (kabushiki kaisha) of having a corporate auditor or committee
system will remain in effect,10 the new Corporation Law provides
numerous changes to the applicable corporate governance rules including:
(i) enhancing the qualification requirements of directors;11 (ii) permitting
the creation of an accounting counselor (kaikei-sanyo) in the articles of
incorporation of a joint stock company;12 (iii) allowing for board approval
in writing by amending the articles of incorporation in contrast to the prior
requirement of at least a telephone conference;13 and (iv) requiring that a
majority vote of shareholders will dismiss a director with or without cause
in contrast to the prior supermajority vote requirement.14
•

Expansion of cash-out and triangular mergers. The provisions to take
effect in May 2007 will make cash-out and triangular mergers more
available to foreign companies, which at present can engage in such
transactions only when carried out under a special law that requires

10

See Corporation Law, art. 326, para. 2.

11

See Corporation Law, art. 331, para. 1.

12

See Corporation Law, art. 326, para. 2.

13

See Corporation Law, art. 370.

14

See Corporation Law, art. 341. The company may still elect to increase the voting requirement to a
supermajority by amending its articles of incorporation. See id.
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government consent.15 The new structures will permit the surviving
company in a statutory merger between two Japanese companies to use
cash or stock of its non-Japanese parent company (or a combination) as
the consideration given to the shareholders of the disappearing company.
•

New limited voting right pills. In addition to the types of poison pills
currently available under Japanese law, the new Corporation Law permits
Japanese companies to issue a poison pill that can limit the voting rights of
a hostile acquirer in contrast to the customary dilution of voting power in a
flip-in/flip-out pill in the U.S.16

B.

Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law

Separate from the new requirements of the new Corporation Law, certain
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law17 have gone into effect or are currently
being considered by the Japan Financial Services Agency (“FSA”), which include the
following:

15

See Corporation Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2.; Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization,
Law No. 131 of 1999, art. 12-9, para. 1.

16

See Corporation Law, art. 108.

17

The Securities and Exchange Law was originally modeled on the U.S. federal securities laws,
although in operation there are substantial differences between the two systems of securities
regulation. See generally Hiroshi Oda, JAPANESE LAW 268-271 (2d ed. 1999).
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•

Definition of “market” trading in the tender offer rules. These
amendments went into effect in July 2005, and were largely in response to
Livedoor’s purchases of Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. shares by
means of an after hours, off-exchange trading system of Tokyo Stock
Exchange, Inc. (the “Tokyo Stock Exchange”).18 As a general matter, the
Japanese tender offer rules under the Securities and Exchange Law apply
when an acquirer obtains more than one third of voting rights in the target
company.19 Once the tender offer rules are triggered, the acquirer must
either submit a tender offer to all shareholders or continue to obtain shares
by market purchases. The particular issue with the Livedoor trades was
whether the after hours, off-exchange trades were “market” purchases that
complied with the tender offer rules. Since the law at that time was
unclear on the issue, the amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law
generally prohibited such trading in the absence of a tender offer that
otherwise complied with the applicable rules and regulations.

•

Permitted withdrawal of tender offers. Due to the increase in hostile
activity in Japan, the FSA is currently revisiting the possible instances
where a hostile acquirer may withdraw a tender offer. At present, the

18

See Shoken- torihiki-ho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1
[hereinafter Securities and Exchange Law].

19

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 1.
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tender offer rules do not explicitly provide that a tender offeror may
withdraw a tender offer in response to certain defensive mechanisms, such
as share purchase warrants and stock splits. Since there is the expectation
that increasing numbers of Japanese companies will adopt defensive
measures in various forms, the FSA is currently planning to explicitly
provide that a tender offeror may withdraw a tender offer when the board
of the target company refuses to cancel its defensive measures.20
•

Proposed changes to substantial shareholder reports. The FSA plans to
revise the rules for substantial shareholder reports under the Securities and
Exchange Law, which are similar to Schedule 13D filings in the United
States. Under the current rules, a shareholder and its group that holds
more than 5% of the issued shares of a Japanese company must file the
substantial shareholder report within five business days after crossing the
5% threshold, except for certain institutional investors which are permitted
to file the reports in a longer period of time. The FSA plans to shorten this
longer period for institutional investors, although it is not certain whether

20

See KINYUSHINGIKAI KINYUBUNKAKAI DAIICHIBUKAI [THE FIRST SECTION OF THE FINANCE DIVISION
OF THE FINANCE COUNCIL], KOKAIKAITSUKESEIDOTO WORKING GROUP HOKOKU [THE REPORT THE
WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE TENDER OFFER AND OTHER RULES] 8 (December 16, 2005),
http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_kinyu/siryou/kinyu/dai1/tob/f-20051216-3..pdf (last visited Mar. 7,
2006) [hereinafter THE TENDER OFFER REPORT]. Additionally, on July 22, 2005, a minister of the
FSA orally suggested that the existing tender offer rules should be interpreted so that a tender offer
can be withdrawn due to a stock split that would constitute a materially adversely effect with respect
to the tender offer. See Transcript of FSA News Conference of July 22, 2005, http://www.fsa.go.jp/
gaiyou/gaiyouj/daijin2005b/20050722-1.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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this will eventually become law as there have been objections to such
proposals.21 Furthermore, the FSA has proposed that all substantial
shareholder reports be filed electronically.22 A widely shared opinion is
that these proposed changes have been partly in response to the recent
activities of certain institutional investors.
C.

Notable Guidelines and Rules

In addition to the numerous changes to Japanese law, government ministries and
other organizations have addressed the issues raised by the recent increase in hostile deals
through the issuance of various guidelines and rules. While these guidelines and rules
may not necessarily result in binding legal obligations for a company in a given case,
they do provide important guidance as to how the legal and business communities in
Japan are currently considering the issues associated with the increase in takeover activity.
•

The Corporate Value Report. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (“METI”) established the Corporate Value Study Group, which
was comprised by noted legal scholars and business representatives. The
Group considered the applicable rules on hostile deals in other
jurisdictions, including an analysis of the rules that apply in the U.S. and
Europe. In May 2005, the Group issued its report on the recommended

21

See THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 12.

22

See id.
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rules for defensive measures in Japan (the “Corporate Value Report”),
which discussed the Delaware experience with takeovers and the Unocal
standard,23 while also observing that additional changes would be needed
to the rules in foreign jurisdictions to comport with Japanese practices.24
In November 2005, the Group also provided a written opinion on how
stock exchanges should treat rights plans, including the desired level of
disclosure in such instances. The Group stated in its written opinion that
shares with veto rights (so-called “golden shares”) should be allowed for
public companies under certain conditions. For example, a company
which issues golden shares should: (i) establish clear exercise conditions,
(ii) provide that such shares can be cancelled at a shareholder or board
meeting, and (iii) limit the effective period for such shares.25
•

The Defensive Measures Guidelines. Based on the prior work contained in
the Corporate Value Report, in May 2005 METI and the Ministry of
Justice announced guidelines regarding the preferred uses of and advised

23

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

24

See KIGYOKACHI KENKYUKAI [Corporate Value Study Group], KIGYOKACHI HOKOKUSHO [Corporate
Value Report] (2005) [hereinafter THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP and THE CORPORATE
VALUE REPORT, respectively], http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20050527005/3-houkokusho-honntaiset.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).

25

See THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, KOSEINA BAISHUBOEISAKU NO ARIKATA NI KANSURU
RONTENKOKAI [Disclosure of issues regarding fairness of defensive measures] 9 (2005),
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20051110002/3-ronntennkoukai-set.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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limitations to rights plans (the “Defensive Measures Guidelines”).26
While the Defensive Measures Guidelines do not have the force of law,
given their persuasive authority most Japanese companies follow their
mandates when designing their rights plans.
•

Tokyo Stock Exchange Rules. In March 2006, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
made public its new rules on the permitted defensive measures of listed
companies.27 The new rules requires sufficient disclosure of defensive
measures and prior consultation with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The
draft rules prohibited golden shares, which resulted in strong objections
from the FSA and METI. Thus, the new rules permit golden shares “when
the Tokyo Stock Exchange acknowledges that the defensive measure is
not likely to infringe the benefits of shareholders and investors in light of
the company’s business purposes, the purpose for issuing the golden
shares, the content of the rights, the attributes of subscribers, and other

26

See KEIZAISANGYO-SHO[Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry] & HOMU-SHO [Ministry of
Justice], KIGYOKACHI KABUNUSI KYODO NO RIEKI NO KAKUHO MATAWA KOJO NO TAMENO
BAISHUBOIEISAKU NI KANSURU SHISHIN [Guideline regarding defensive measures to secure and
increase corporate value and shareholders’ common benefits] (2005) [hereinafter THE DEFENSIVE
MEASURES GUIDELINES], available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20050527005/3-shishinn-honntaiset.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).

27

TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, BAISHUBOEISAKU NO DONYU NI KAKARU JOJOSEIDO NO SEIBITO NI
TOMONAU KABUKENJOJOSHINSAKIJUNTO NO ICHIBUKAISEI NI TSUITE [Re: Partial Amendment of the
Stock Listing Requirements, etc. accompanying the Adjustment, etc. of the Listing System regarding
the Adoption of Defensive Measures] (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.tse.or.jp/guide/rule/taisho/
060307_a1.pdf.
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conditions of the golden shares.”28 Note that as matter of policy the New
York Stock Exchange prohibits the issuance of golden shares by listed
companies.29
•

Pension Fund Association Guidelines. In April 2005, the Pension Fund
Association (kigyo nenkin kikin rengokai, formerly kosei nenkin kikin
rengokai) announced guidelines regarding the exercise of voting rights in
connection with proposed defensive measures (amended on April 10,
2006).30 The Pension Fund Association represents the interests of pension
fund participants at various Japanese companies, although it should be
noted that there are significant differences between Japanese and U.S.
pensions funds as a matter of practice.31 As part of these guidelines, the
Pension Fund Association noted that it generally approves of rights plans
provided that (i) the company in question sufficiently explains how the
rights plan will increase corporate value, (ii) the rights plan is approved at

28

Id. at 2.

29

See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 308.00 (1999). However, one should note that while “golden
shares” in the U.S. or Japan may have the common element of veto rights, they may operate quite
differently in practice. For instance, as further discussed infra, the Class E Preferred Shares in the
UFJ Holdings – Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group merger had deal protection elements when reading
the specific text of the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization.

30

KOSEI NENKIN KIKIN RENGOKAI [Pension Fund Association], KIGYOBAISHUBOEISAKU NI KANSURU
KABUNUSHI GIKETSUKEN KOSHI NO HANDANKIJUN [Decision Standard of Exercise of Voting Rights
regarding Defensive Measures] (Apr. 10, 2006),
http://www.pfa.or.jp/top/jigyou/pdf/gov_20050428.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).

31

For instance, Japanese pension funds are not as likely to be lead plaintiffs in securities class actions or
derivative suits in a manner that has increasingly become the norm in the United States.
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a shareholders meeting, (iii) the decision of the directors will not be
arbitrary, and (iv) the rights plan is for a limited duration of time. The
guidelines also object to golden shares and dead hand poison pills.
II.

Recent Contested Deals in Japan
In concert with the changes in Japanese law, we have seen an increase in the

number of contested deals in Japan in recent years.32 While people may reasonably
disagree as to what this means for the Japanese M&A markets as a whole, what appears
to be beyond doubt is that the contested deal can now be proposed whereas it may have
been merely a theoretical proposal in the past. This past year provided the first clear
signs that contested deals can happen with the some of the more notable examples being
the UFJ Holdings – Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group merger and the Livedoor hostile
bid for Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. Given the primary importance of the facts in
these new types of transactions, it is worth taking a moment to review the specifics of a
few selected contested deals from 2005.

32

For this section we use the broader term “contested” deals rather than “hostile” deals since some of
the transactions may not be properly defined as hostile. For instance, the UFJ Holdings – Mitsubishi
Tokyo Financial Group merger involved an unsolicited third party bid but not a tender offer or proxy
contest. However, for purposes of the definition of “contested” deals in this article, we do not intend
to include those deals that are subject to a regular bidding process designed by the target company.
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A.

UFJ – MTFG Merger33

The events which ultimately led to the merger of UFJ Holdings, Inc. (“UFJ
Holdings”) with Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Inc. (“MTFG”) actually began in the
spring of 2004, when UFJ Holdings and its subsidiaries, UFJ Bank Limited (“UFJ Bank”)
and UFJ Trust Bank Limited (“UFJ Trust Bank”), entered into a Basic Agreement with
The Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. (“STB”).34 Signed on May 21, 2004, the Basic
Agreement provided, inter alia, STB with the right to further discuss the possible
acquisition of UFJ Trust Bank for a two-year period, together with a no-shop clause. On
July 14, 2004, however, the UFJ Group notified STB of the termination of their
discussions under the Basic Agreement and began separate discussions with MTFG for
the possible acquisition by MTFG of the UFJ Group’s entire business.35
On July 16, 2004, UFJ Holdings and MTFG signed a memorandum of
understanding which provided for further discussions on a complete integration between
their two banking groups. That same day STB filed a preliminary injunction at the Tokyo
33

During his secondment to Nishimura & Partners Mr. Hines participated in the firm’s representation of
UFJ Holdings in connection with its merger discussions with MTFG. The Nishimura team was led by
Masakazu Iwakura, a member partner of the firm, and the firm’s negotiation team included partners
Takefumi Sato and Hirotada Inoshita, and associates Daisuke Matsubara, Yuki Oi and Hidetoshi
Matsumura. However, all matters in this article are now of public record.

34

A more detailed summary of the facts leading up to the vote at the UFJ and MTFG shareholders
meetings is available in the registration statement filed by MTFG with the Commission. See
Amendment No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18,
2005, at 63-68 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>).

35

The UFJ Group was comprised of UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank, UFJ Trust Bank and UFJ Tsubasa
Securities Co., Ltd.
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District Court against UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank and UFJ Trust Bank to prevent any
further discussions with MTFG on a possible integration. STB prevailed at the Tokyo
District Court on July 27, 2004,36 however this ruling was later overturned on appeal
before the Tokyo High Court on August 11, 2004.37 The Supreme Court of Japan
affirmed the Tokyo High Court’s decision on August 30, 2004.38
On August 24, 2004, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. (“SMFG”) made an
unsolicited proposal to UFJ Holdings for a one-for-one stock merger which represented
about a 30% premium to UFJ Holdings shareholders based on the share prices of the two
companies around that time. On September 10, 2004, MTFG, UFJ Holdings and UFJ
Bank signed the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization which provided a 700 billion yen
cash infusion from MTFG in consideration of certain Class E Preferred Shares of UFJ
Bank. These preferred shares provided MTFG with veto rights upon certain triggering
events as set forth in the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization.39

36

See STB v. UFJ Holdings, 1708 Shoji Homu 22 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 4, 2004).

37

See UFJ Holdings v. STB, 1708 Shoji Homu 23 (Tokyo High Ct., Aug. 11, 2004).

38

See STB v. UFJ Holdings, 1708 Shoji Homu 23 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 30, 2004). The Supreme Court ruling
finally adjudicated STB’s claims for injunctive relief, however STB was still able to continue suit
against UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank and UFJ Trust Bank for monetary damages due to the alleged breach
and termination of the Basic Agreement. On February 13, 2006, the Tokyo District Court denied
STB’s request for 100 billion yen in damages. STB appealed this ruling to the Tokyo High Court on
February 24, 2006.

39

An English summary of the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization is included the Form F-4 filing. See
Amendment No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18,
2005, at 111-113 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>), see also Masakazu Iwakura & Yuki Oi, M&A Torihiki Keiyaku ni
okeru Hibaishukaisha no Kabunushi no Riekihogo 3(i) [Protection of the Interests of Target Company
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On February 18, 2005, the UFJ Group and MTFG Group40 signed an Integration
Agreement which provided the merger ratios for the proposed integration in addition to
the first fiduciary-out clause in the history of major Japanese M&A deals to the extent
known through publicly available sources.41 On February 25, 2005, SMFG withdrew its
outstanding offer to UFJ Holdings for a proposed integration. On April 20, 2005, UFJ
Holdings and MTFG signed the Merger Agreement.42 The proposed integration as set
forth in the Merger Agreement was approved at each of the shareholders meetings of UFJ
Holdings and MTFG in June 2005, and the merger date was October 1, 2005 for most of
the group entities with the remaining UFJ Bank and The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi
having a merger date of January 1, 2006.
Shareholders in M&A Agreements 3(i)], 1747 Shoji Homu 30, 35 (2005) (discussing how the Class E
Preferred Shares had deal protection elements such as a break-up fee whereby UFJ had a call option to
purchase such shares at a price higher than the issuance price).
40

The MTFG Group included MTFG, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Limited, The Mitsubishi Trust
and Banking Corporation, and Mitsubishi Securities, Co., Ltd.

41

An English translation of the Integration Agreement is included the Form F-4 filing. See Amendment
No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18, 2005, at A-A-1
through A-A-21 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>). The fiduciary-out clause is at Section 50 of the Integration
Agreement, and provides language that is slightly different from a “superior proposal” formulation
that would be considered customary in U.S. public company deals. See id. at A-A-14, A-A-15. In
particular, the fiduciary-out is subject to the agreement of the parties by providing, “If, as the result of
such discussion [on the Business Integration, New Terms (if any), and Third Party Proposal], MTFG
and UFJ Holdings reach an agreement (such agreement shall not be refused or delayed without any
reasonable cause; and the burden of proving in advance that there is no such reasonable cause is
placed on the Proposal Receiving Party), they may, on the agreed terms and conditions, (a) modify the
terms and conditions of the Mergers, (b) exempt the Proposal Receiving Party from its obligations
under this Agreement…, or (c) terminate this Agreement.” Id. at A-A-15.

42

An English translation of the Merger Agreement is included the Form F-4 filing. See Amendment
No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18, 2005, at A-B-1
through A-B-6 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>).
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The UFJ – MTFG merger is important for numerous reasons, not least of which is
that the combined entity MUFG is the largest Japanese financial institution and the
largest bank in the world in terms of assets. Beyond the business ramifications, however,
the merger is noteworthy from the M&A practitioner’s perspective in that it involved a
number of firsts: the first bidding war among major Japanese banks in recent memory,
the first time that shares with veto rights were used in a major Japanese M&A deal as a
deal protection strategy, and as noted previously the first time a fiduciary-out clause was
included in a major Japanese M&A deal to the extent publicly known. Although it is yet
to be seen whether such new aspects to Japanese deals will become “market” or the
exception to existing trends and customs,43 the fact that all these firsts occurred within the
scope of one transaction clearly suggests that Japanese M&A markets are much more
dynamic and creative than may have been the case only a few years ago.

43

For instance, the discussion concerning the possible impact of the fiduciary-out clause in the UFJMTFG Integration Agreement continues. See Masakazu Iwakura & Yuki Oi, M&A Torihiki Keiyaku
ni okeru Hibaishukaisha no Kabunushi no Riekihogo 3(ii) [Protection of the Interests of Target
Company Shareholders in M&A Agreements 3(ii)], 1748 Shoji Homu 37, 40 (2005) (articulating that
the necessity for discussions about the protection of target company shareholders’ benefits is
increasing), see also, Robert G. DeLaMater, Director Fiduciary Duties in the Context of M&A
Transactions: Relevance of U.S. Experience in Japan, paper submitted at Association of the Bar of
the City of New York symposium, M&A Transaction: Does the U.S. Style Work in Japan?, Apr. 4,
2005, at 18 (“Under the present state of fiduciary duty jurisprudence in Japan, the bidder and its
counsel should consider carefully and generally seek to resist any proposal by the target to include
fiduciary out provisions in the acquisition agreement”). One indication that fiduciary outs may be on
the rise is certain language contained in the Corporate Value Report and the Defensive Measures
Guidelines which generally recommend that a target company consider possible competing proposals
even when there is a white knight. See THE CORPORATE VALUE REPORT, at 85 (“In the event that a
board already decided a sale of the company and is negotiating the sale with a third party, if a
competing hostile acquirer emerges, the board is generally required to study a competing proposal of
such acquirer. A measure that completely takes away the opportunity to study such proposal is
inappropriate without any special rationale not to study such proposal.”) (emphasis added); THE
DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 4-5.
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B.

Livedoor – Fuji Television

While the UFJ – MTFG represented many firsts for Japanese M&A, the Livedoor
– Fuji Television saga is noteworthy in a different manner in that it caught the public
imagination and was a topic of discussion in many boardroom meetings since it possibly
signaled the beginning of the true hostile bid. It would not be unreasonable to believe
that executives at many public Japanese companies, witnessing the dramatic events in the
Livedoor hostile bid unfold in the press, quickly revisited their existing defensive
measures and contemplated possibly improving their defensive profile by issuing poison
pills and the like. The facts of the Livedoor hostile bid are well known in Japan and may
not require much repeating, and thus the essential facts are as follows.
In January2005, Fuji Television Network, Inc. ( “Fuji Television”), which held
12.4% of shares issued by Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (“NBS”), launched a tender
offer for 100% of NBS shares at 5,950 yen per share. The tender offer represented
approximately a 21% premium over the market price, and was launched partly because
Fuji Television sought to rectify the situation where its de facto subsidiary, NBS, owned
22.51% of Fuji Television issued shares. The NBS board approved the Fuji Television
tender offer. During the tender offer period, Livedoor, Inc. (“Livedoor”), an internet
business company, acquired NBS issued shares through an after-hours, off-exchange
trading system operated by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which resulted in its holding
39.56% of NBS issued shares. This system is not a fully liquid market in that the buyer
may purchase from specific sellers on an anonymous basis to a certain extent. Although
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the Livedoor trades were legal at the time, many observers thought that such trading
circumvented the tender offer rules which generally require an acquirer to make a tender
offer or purchase shares in the market after passing the one third ownership threshold for
target shares.
On February 28, 2005, the market price of NBS shares was 6,700 yen. In March
2005, Fuji Television purchased NBS issued shares as a result of its tender offer, which
resulted in its holding 36.47% of NBS issued shares.
On February 23, 2005, NBS announced that it was issuing to Fuji Television
certain share purchase warrants44 exercisable at 5,950 yen per share. The effect of these
share purchase warrants was that it would give Fuji Television majority control in NBS
and dilute Livedoor’s shareholding to less than 20%. Livedoor brought an action to
enjoin the issuance of the warrants, and in March 2005 prevailed at both the Tokyo
District Court and the Tokyo High Court.45

44

Share purchase warrants are securities under Japanese law and can be issued with or without
consideration. See Corporation Law, art. 238, para. 1, no. 2. In accordance with the specific terms
and conditions of such warrants, a holder can exercise and receive additional company shares. See
Corporation Law, art. 236, para. 1. In this manner, share purchase warrants can serve a function
similar to a shareholder rights plan in the United States.

45

See NBS v. Livedoor, 1728 Shoji Homu 41 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 3, 23, 2005). Japanese courts have
established a “primary purpose rule” whereby the issuance of equity securities can be enjoined if
dilution of an acquirer’s shareholding ratio predominates over other reasons for such issuance. See
KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KABUSIKI KAISHA-HO AND YUGENKAISHA-HO 587 (3d ed. 2004). This rule can
generally be applied in poison pill situations. However, in its ruling the Tokyo High Court enunciated
certain exceptions to the primary purpose rule such as greenmailing, corporate raiding, issuing
extraordinary dividends through assets sale and so forth. See NBS v. Livedoor, 1728 Shoji Homu 41,
46 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 3, 23, 2005). None of these exceptions were found to apply in the Livedoor
case. See id. at 47-49.
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By the end of March 2005, Livedoor’s shareholdings in NBS issued shares
exceeded 50%. In April 2005, Fuji Television, NBS and Livedoor agreed to a settlement
which had three main points. First, NBS will become Fuji Television’s wholly owned
subsidiary, and Fuji Television and NBS agreed to pay 6,300 yen per share to NBS
shareholders. This price was almost the same as or slightly higher than Livedoor’s cost
to acquire its NBS shares. The going private transaction closed on September 1, 2005.
Second, Fuji Television agreed to subscribe to 12.75% of Livedoor issued shares, which
fell just short of the 15% threshold under the applicable accounting rules that would
trigger a partial consolidation of Livedoor. This share subscription closed in May 2005.
Third, Fuji Television, NBS and Livedoor agreed to discuss possible business alliances.
The long term effects of the Livedoor hostile bid are still difficult to gauge in light
of subsequent allegations of accounting fraud at Livedoor and certain of its affiliated
entities. Whether Livedoor will indeed become “Japan’s Enron”, as many have initially
observed, will be an issue to consider in the months and years ahead.46 However, what
can be observed with some degree of confidence at this point in time is that the Livedoor
hostile bid dramatically increased the awareness of Japanese boards to the various legal
issues that arise in hostile deals. Thus, if the Livedoor cases are something akin to the

46

At least in the United States, the more appropriate measure may be years since it is worth noting that
the trials of top Enron executives were in full swing in 2006 while the bankruptcy was filed in 2001.
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effect that Unocal or Revlon47 had in the U.S. experience, the Livedoor cases
substantially expanded the development of Japanese takeovers jurisprudence.
C.

Yumeshin – Japan Engineering Consultants

Another important transaction for the issues it raised under Japanese law was the
Yumeshin – Japanese Engineering Consultants deal. Although perhaps not as well
known as the UFJ – MTFG merger or the Livedoor hostile bid, the interplay of the
Japanese tender offer rules with permissible defensive measures in the Yumeshin
transaction merits its own consideration and discussion. It all started in May 2005, when
a financial adviser of Yumeshin Holdings Co. Ltd. (“Yumeshin”), a holding company for
construction management and other related businesses, informed Japan Engineering
Consultants Co., Ltd. (“JEC”), a construction consulting company, that Yumeshin sought
to acquire additionalJEC shares so that it would become a 51% owner. At that time,
Yumeshin held 6.83% of JEC issued shares. On July 7, 2005, Yumeshin proposed a
business alliance with JEC.
On July 8, 2005, JEC announced its general defense policy which provided that
the company would exercise certain defensive measures if an acquirer began purchasing
JEC shares prior to the completion of JEC’s review of the proposed acquisition as
presented by such acquirer. JEC noted that such defensives measures were yet to be
determined. In response, on July 11, 2005, Yumeshin announced a tender offer for
47

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
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46.88% of JEC issued shares at the maximum, which would result in its holding 53.71%
of JEC issued shares, at 550 yen per share. This tender offer priced JEC shares at about a
68% premium over the market price.
On July 18, 2005, JEC announced a stock split with one share being split into five
shares that were to be distributed to shareholders of record as of August 8, 2005—prior to
the end of Yumeshin’s tender offer period.48 The stock split was scheduled to take place
in October 2005—after Yumeshin’s tender offer period—thus the settlement date of the
tender offer was necessarily delayed to account for the upcoming stock split. On July 20,
2005, however, Yumeshin launched a tender offer at 110 yen per share, which accounted
for the one-for-five stock split. In addition, Yumeshin brought an action at the Tokyo
District Court to temporarily enjoin the stock split. On July 29, 2005, the Tokyo District
Court denied Yumeshin’s request for a temporary injunction.49 On that same day, JEC

48

Under the current tender offer rules, a tender offeror is generally not allowed to reduce its tender offer
price, and it is unclear whether it may reduce its tender offer price in the case of a stock split by the
target. See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-6, para. 3. Thus, JEC could have announced the
stock split after Yumeshin launched the tender offer so that it would be uncertain as to whether
Yumeshin could reduce its tender offer price to account for the impending stock split. However, it
appears that JEC announced the stock split prior to Yumeshin’s tender offer in order to avoid any
possible confusion among JEC shareholders.

49

See Yumeshin v. JEC, 1739 Shoji Homu 100 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 29, 2005). The Tokyo District
Court noted that as general matter the board of directors of a target company may request additional
information from a tender offeror and arrange for a discussion period in furtherance of the proper
judgment of shareholders. See id. at 107. Furthermore, the court observed that a board of directors of
a target company can take proportionate defensive measures when an acquirer does not respond to the
target company’s reasonable requests. See id. at 108. Although the court suggested that JEC could
have obtained the necessary information by responding to Yumeshin’s proposal for a possible
business alliance, it held that JEC’s stock split was not unreasonable because JEC’s stock split did not
make Yumeshin’s tender offer impossible although it pushed back the settlement date. See id. at 1089.
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announced thatit planned to issu e share purchase warrants to all of its shareholders upon
shareholder approval at the upcoming annual general shareholders meeting in September
2005. Such warrants provided that they could not be exercised by a hostile acquirer who
held in excess of 20% of JEC issued shares.
The next development was, as might be anticipated, the entry of a white squire.
On August 8, 2005, Eight Consultants Co., Ltd. (“Eight Consultants”) announced a
tender offer for 50.1% of JEC voting shares at the minimum at a price of 118 yen per
share. Eight Consultants also made public a business alliance with JEC. The Eight
Consultants tender offer was launched on August 9, 2005, and it was approved by the
JEC board. During the month of August, Yumeshin was able to purchase only about 4%
of JEC shares. In October 2005, Eight Consultants decreased the minimum number of
JEC shares to be purchased in its tender offer to 20%, and ultimately purchased about
23% of JEC issued shares. Due to the entry of a white squire, JEC did not issue share
purchase warrants at its annual general shareholders’ meeting in September 2005.
The Yumeshin failed tender offer provides a good example of defensive measures
that ultimately worked. While the Tokyo District Court did not give its definitive
approval to JEC’s proposed stock split, in contrast to the Livedoor hostile bid the court
did not choose to enjoin JEC’s defensive measures. Thus, the combination of the
announcement of a general defense policy, a proposed stock split which delayed the
hostile tender offer, the threat of an issuance of share purchase warrants, and the entry of
a white squire ultimately worked to defeat the Yumeshin bid.
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D.

Other Notable Contested Deals

The list of recent contested deals could continue at length and provide a number
of insights into current practices and strategies in Japanese M&A. However, in order to
highlight the essential points and move on to an analysis of the key issues for the U.S.
practitioner, we have narrowed the list down to two additional deals that many will likely
recall from this past year.
(1)

Rakuten – TBS

Another hostile bid which generated a great deal of coverage in Japan was the
Rakuten, Inc. (“Rakuten”) bid for Tokyo Broadcasting System, Inc. (“TBS”). In October
2005, Rakuten, an internet business company, purchased 19.09% of TBS issued shares
and proposed the integration of the two companies which would create a holding
company under which both Rakuten and TBS would become subsidiaries.50 However,
Rakuten was not able to purchase additional TBS shares in part because TBS had already
issued to Nikko Principal Investments Japan Inc. (“NPI”)51 certain share purchase
warrants that would be triggered upon the hostile acquisition of more than 20% of TBS

50

An added element to this transaction was that both parties owned professional Japanese baseball
teams: Rakuten with its Rakuten Eagles of Sendai in northern Japan and TBS with its Yokohama Bay
Stars.

51

NPI is a subsidiary of Nikko Cordial Corporation, a financial services group.
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issued shares.52 The matter was ultimately resolved by Rakuten and TBS reaching a
settlement at the end of November 2005. The terms of the settlement provided that: (i)
Rakuten will withdraw its integration proposal; (ii) Rakuten and TBS will discuss
possible business alliances until the end of March 2006 (later amended to June 2006); and
(iii) until the end of March 2006 (later amended to June 2006), Rakuten’s holdings of
TBS shares shall be less than 10% and any holdings in excess of such threshold shall be
placed into a trust account.
The Rakuten hostile bid is an example of share purchase warrants that operated in
a manner that is familiar for the U.S. practitioner. Specifically, the warrants forced
Rakuten to negotiate with management or roll the dice by going straight to the
shareholders through a tender offer or proxy contest. This is in stark contrast to the
Livedoor hostile bid, where for the reasons noted previously Livedoor was able to acquire
shares without negotiating with management or launching a tender offer. A critical point
for TBS was that its poison pill was already in place and was not contested by Rakuten in
injunction proceedings before the Japanese courts. On this point, the cautionary tale of
Fuji Television’s prior difficulties was no doubt helpful to TBS in its advance preparation
against a hostile bidder.

52

Once triggered, such share purchase warrants gave NPI a right to acquire approximately 21.2% of
TBS issued shares at 90% of the average market price during the six months prior to the crossing of
the 20% threshold by the hostile acquirer.

23
Doing Deals in Japan.doc

(2)

M&A Consulting – Hanshin

M&A Consulting, Inc. (“M&A Consulting”), the well known fund led by Mr.
Yoshiaki Murakami, has been involved in a number of contested deals in recent years.53
One of the more recent deals for M&A Consulting, which also resulted in much Japanese
press coverage, was the acquisition of shares in Hanshin Electric Railway Co., Ltd.
(“Hanshin”).54 In September 2005, M&A Consulting announced that an affiliated entity
held approximately 27% of Hanshin shares on a fully diluted basis. There was no express
consent of Hanshin. In January2006 these shareholdings eventually increased to a high
of 44.49%. Importantly, and in contrast to TBS, Hanshin did not have any share
purchase warrants in place to deter this acquisition of shares. Although the discussions
between M&A Consulting and Hanshin are continuing as of March 19, 2006, what is
clear is that in the absence of duly issued share purchase warrants a target is considerably
more vulnerable to the acquisition of its shares by a possible hostile bidder.

53

In January 2000, M&A Consulting launched a tender offer for shares of Shoei Co., Ltd. (“Shoei”), a
real estate business company. However, certain major shareholders of Shoei, which together held
more than 60% of Shoei shares, opposed the tender offer. In addition, Shoei announced a
restructuring plan. The tender offer failed. In May 2002, M&A Consulting engaged in a proxy
contest for control of Tokyo Style Co., Ltd., an apparel company. However, M&A Consulting
eventually lost the proxy contest. In November 2005, M&A Consulting launched a competitive
tender offer against a friendly tender offer by Nisshinbo Industries, Inc (“Nisshinbo”) for shares of
New Japan Radio Co., Ltd. (“New Japan Radio”), a microwave-related product manufacturer. The
highest tender offer price for M&A Consulting was 950 yen per share compared to a high of 880 yen
per share for Nisshinbo. However, Japan Radio Co., Ltd., the parent company of New Japan Radio
which held slightly under a majority of New Japan Radio shares, accepted Nisshinbo’s tender offer.
Consequently, the M&A Consulting tender offer failed.

54

This transaction also includes a famous Japanese professional baseball—the Hanshin Tigers. See note
50 supra.
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III.

Key Issues for the U.S. Practitioner
Having now reviewed the recent changes in Japanese law and a few recent

contested deals from this past year, the challenge for the U.S. practitioner is to boil down
the complexity of Japanese M&A to a list of key issues that should be reviewed in any
transaction which involves Japanese entities. In reaching such a concentrated analysis,
however, the problem with any set of action items or the like is that it cannot replace a
thorough analysis of the variety of legal issues in different jurisdictions that will
necessarily arise in any cross-border deal. At the same time, in practice such lists are
frequently helpful in organizing the various tasks and issues that must be considered.
With these thoughts in mind, in this section we have set forth some of the main issues
under Japanese law and U.S. securities laws that have often come into play in Japanese
deals.
A.

Structuring the Transaction under Japanese Law

Beginning with the fundamentals, there are seven basic transaction structures that
are most often used in takeovers under the Corporation Law. Although these structures
may be similar to certain transactions under the Delaware General Corporation Law that
are familiar to U.S. practitioners, it is important to remember the obvious but essential
point—these are not your usual DGCL transactions. In a given deal, therefore, the seven
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structures below will likely require some measure of additional time and consideration
prior to the final determination of an appropriate transaction structure.55
(1)

Stock Purchase

A simple stock purchase of public company shares through the market is one
option to obtain control of the target.56 However, when the acquirer purchases a certain
number of shares of a public company outside of the market, such purchases may be
subject to the mandatory tender offer rules in Japan.57
(2)

Issuance of New Shares

As a general matter under Japanese law, the board of the target public company
can issue new shares to a third party or shareholders who seek to acquire the target public
company, up to the authorized number of shares as set forth in such target’s articles of
incorporation.58 However, if the subscription price for newly issued shares is deemed

55

As is often the case, tax and accounting issues, as well as possible rights and obligations under certain
contracts that are reviewed as part of the due diligence process, will play a large role in determining
the appropriate structure for a Japanese deal. These issues are beyond the intended scope of this
article.

56

See Corporation Law, art. 127.

57

These issues are addressed in further detail in the discussion of the tender offer rules at Section
III.B(1) infra.

58

See Corporation Law, art. 199, para. 2, and art. 201. para. 1. Note, however, that the issuance of new
shares is not subject to the mandatory tender offer rules. See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2,
para. 1; THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 4.
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“especially favorable”59 to the subscribing shareholders and all the outstanding
shareholders are not entitled to subscribe for them, it will become necessary to obtain a
supermajority vote of two-thirds or more of all voting rights (“Supermajority Vote”).60
Under Japanese law and stock exchange regulations, there is no rule that is equivalent to
the New York Stock Exchange rule that shareholder approval is required for the issuance
of 20% or more of outstanding shares.61
(3)

Merger (gappei)

Japanese gappei are statutory mergers under the Corporation Law. Similar to a
direct proposed merger in the U.S., gappei require a negotiated merger agreement
between the acquirer and the target company which provides thatthe target company (the
disappearing company) will merge into the acquirer (the surviving company).62 In
Japanese mergers, all assets and liabilities of the target company are transferred to the
surviving company by operation of law, and target company shareholders receive shares

59

Although there are no bright line rules in the Japanese cases as to what is an “especially favorable”
issuance, in practice the subscription price per share is often regarded as “especially favorable” if it is
less than 90% of recent average market prices. See Matsuka v. Miyairi Barubu Seisakujo (Tokyo
Dist. Ct., June 1, 2004), summarized in Yo Ota, Miyairi Barubu no Shinkabuhakko Sashidome
Moshitate Jiken Tokyo District Court Kettei [Ruling of Tokyo District Court regarding Claim for
Injunction of Issuance of New Shares of Miyairi Barubu], 1702 Shoji Homu 24, 24-25 (2004).

60

More specifically, the supermajority requirement is two-thirds or more of the voting rights of
shareholders who attend the shareholders meeting, unless the threshold is otherwise increased in the
target’s articles of incorporation. See Corporation Law, art. 309, para. 2, no. 5.

61

See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2004).

62

See Corporation Law, chapter 5, subchapter 2.
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of the surviving company as consideration.63 However, under the new Corporation Law,
target company shareholders may receive other forms of consideration such as cash and
shares of other companies (i.e., consideration will no longer be limited to shares of the
surviving company).64 Japanese mergers are generally subject to a Supermajority Vote at
the shareholders meeting of each of the disappearing and surviving companies.65
(4)

Business Transfer (jigyo joto)

Business transfers are similar to asset sales in the United States. They also
require a negotiated agreement between the target company and the acquirer, with such
agreement providing that certain assets and liabilities will be transferred from the target
company to the acquirer.66 The transfer of contracts (including employment contracts)
generally requires the consent of the other parties to such contracts under Japanese law.
Furthermore, if the transferred assets and liabilities constitute “all or an important part” of
the target company’s business, the business transfer in question generally requires a
Supermajority Vote of the target company shareholders.67 In addition, if the transferred
63

See Corporation Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2(i).

64

For additional details on this point, please refer to the discussion on triangular mergers at Section
III.C infra.

65

See Corporation Law, art. 783, para. 1; art. 795, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no. 12.

66

See Corporation Law, art. 467.

67

See Corporation Law, art. 467, para. 1, no. 1 and 2, and art. 309, para. 2, no. 11. Under the new
Corporation Law, if the book value of the transferred assets does not exceed 20% of the amount of all
assets of the target company (with such amount calculated in accordance with an ordinance of the
Ministry of Justice), the business transfer is not regarded as “important” unless as may otherwise be
provided in the articles of incorporation of the target company.
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assets and liabilities constitute all of the target company’s business, the business transfer
generally requires a Supermajority Vote of the acquirer shareholders.68
(5)

Demerger (bunkatsu)

The demerger structure is in many ways similar to business transfers as discussed
above. There are two kinds of demergers under the Corporation Law.
(i)

Shareholders

Absorption Demerger (kyushu bunkatsu)

Target
Company

Shareholders

Absorbing
Company

Target
Company

Absorbing
Company

In an absorption demerger, by means of a negotiated agreement between the
target company and the absorbing company (a) certain assets and liabilitiesof the target
company are transferred to the absorbing company and (b) the target company receives
absorbing company shares as consideration.69 However, in the same manner as discussed
previously with mergers, under the new Corporation Law in an absorption demerger the

68

See Corporation Law, art. 467, para. 1, no. 3, and art. 309, para. 2, no. 11.

69

See Corporation Law, art. 758, no. 4(i).

29
Doing Deals in Japan.doc

target company may receive other forms of consideration such as cash and shares of other
companies (i.e., consideration is no longer limited to shares of the absorbing company).70
Note, however, that the new Corporation Law does not permit such other forms of
consideration in the second kind of demerger—the incorporation demerger.
(ii)

Incorporation Demerger (shinsetsu bunkatsu)

Target
Company

Target
Company

New
Company

In an incorporation demerger, bymeans of a demerger plan of the target company
(a) the target company incorporates a new company by transferring certain of its assets
and liabilities to such new company and (b) the target company receives new company
shares as consideration.71 In both an absorption and incorporation demerger, assets and
liabilities are generally transferred by operation of law.72 In contrast to business transfers,
however, in both absorption and incorporation demergers the transfer of contracts
70

See Corporation Law, art. 758, no. 4(ii)-(v).

71

See Corporation Law, art. 763, no. 6.

72

See Corporation Law, art. 759, para. 1; art. 764, para. 1.
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(including employment contracts) generally does not require the consent of the other
parties to such contracts.73 However, both absorption and incorporation demergers
involve certain additional disclosure requirements and mandatory procedures to protect
creditors, which do not apply in the case of business transfers.74
A key benefit of both absorption and incorporation demergers is that any number
of companies can jointly conduct the demerger.75 This facet of demergers make them
attractive structures in joint ventures where each party holds a certain number of
subsidiaries, but may wish to effect a business transfer (i.e., an asset sale) rather than a
stock sale of one or more of the subsidiaries to be contributed to the joint venture due to
certain business, tax, accounting or other reasons. Demergers can also be useful
structures in LBO transactions so that the target company can demerge certain assets and
liabilities to a new company, which will then be acquired in a stock purchase by an
acquisition vehicle. Such a structure may be particularly advantageous in circumstances
where the parties seek to exclude contingent liabilities from the deal. Finally, it should
be noted that demergers generally require a Supermajority Vote of (a) the target company

73

See Corporation Law, art. 759, para. 1; art. 764, para. 1.

74

See Corporation Law, art. 782; art. 791, art. 803; 811; art. 789, art. 810.

75

See EGASHIRA, at 707; Corporation Law, art. 762, para. 1.
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shareholders and absorbing company shareholders in an absorption demerger76 or (b) the
target company shareholders in an incorporation demerger.77
(6)

Stock-for-Stock Exchange (kabushiki kokan)

Shareholders

Shareholders

Shareholders

Shareholders

Target
Company

Acquirer

Target
Company

Acquirer

An interesting structure under Japanese law that can often be used to “squeeze
out” minority shareholders is the stock-for-stock exchange. In a kabushiki kokan,
pursuant to a negotiated agreement between the target company and the acquirer (a) the
acquirer acquires all of target company shares by operation of law and (b) target company
shareholders receive acquirer shares as consideration.78 Stock-for-stock exchanges
generally require a Supermajority Vote of each of the target company and acquirer
shareholders.79 Accordingly, if one can obtain the approval of two-thirds or more of
target shareholders (as well as of course the approval of the target board when signing the
76

See Corporation Law, art. 783, para. 1; art. 795, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no.12.

77

See Corporation Law, art. 804, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no.12.

78

See Corporation Law, art. 769, para. 1.

79

See Corporation Law, art. 783, para. 1; art. 795, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no. 12.
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stock-for-stock exchange agreement), the remaining one-third of target shareholders will
have their target shares exchanged for acquirer shares which should decrease their voting
power on a fully diluted basis. At the same time , however, the exchange of shares will
effect the voting power of all the target company and acquirer shareholders because the
total number of acquirer shares will necessarily increase as a result of the stock-for-stock
exchange. The new Corporation Law rules on consideration apply in stock-for-stock
exchange transactions, and thus target company shareholders may receive other forms of
consideration such as cash and shares of other companies (i.e., consideration is not
limited acquirer shares).80 Such changes to Japanese law may facilitate more cash-out
mergers of minority shareholders as is common in the United States.81
(7)

Stock Transfer (kabushiki iten)

Shareholders

Shareholders

New
Company
Target
Company
Target
Company

80

See Corporation Law, art. 768, para. 1, no. 2(ii)-(v).

81

See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 253.
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Another structure which permits the consolidation of shares, but in a manner
distinct from stock- for-stock exchanges, is the stock transfer. A kabushiki iten requires a
stock transfer plan of the target company, by means of which (a) a new company will be
incorporated, (b) the new company will acquire all of target company shares by operation
of law, and (c) target company shareholders will receive new company shares.82 Stock
transfers require a Supermajority Vote of the target company shareholders.83 Moreover,
any number of companies can jointly conduct a stock transfer.84 In such joint stock
transfers (kyodo kabushiki iten), several target companies can create a new joint holding
company with each of the target companies becoming a wholly owned subsidiary
thereof.85 These transactions are particularly useful when parties agree to integrate their
businesses, but would like to keep certain operations separate as a practical matter. Such
a structure can also work to consolidate the shareholdings in a group of companies while
also possibly improving the defensive profile of a company that is likely to be a target of
a hostile bidder by correcting any distortions in such company’s shareholding
relationships with its affiliates since it will become a wholly owned subsidiary of a new
holding company.

82

See Corporation Law, art. 772, para. 1; art. 774, para. 1; and art. 774, para. 2.

83

See Corporation Law, art. 804, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no. 12.

84

See Corporation Law, art. 772.

85

For example, on April 20, 2005, Seven-Eleven Co., Ltd., Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd., and Denny’s Japan
Co., Ltd. announced that they would conduct a joint stock transfer, which when closed on September
1, 2005 resulted in a $12 billion transaction.
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B.

Tender Offers and Proxy Contests

A common factor among all the basic transaction structures under the Corporation
Law discussed above is that, with the notable exception of stock purchases, they all
require some type of negotiated agreement or plan with management. If such
negotiations do not result in such an agreement or plan or may be impractical as the case
may be, Japanese law provides for tender offers in a manner that will be familiar to the
U.S. practitioner. The Japanese takeover bid86 rules (“TOB rules”) were modeled after
the Williams Act and became part of the Securities and Exchange Law in 1971.87 While
it is still relatively rare in Japan for a hostile bidder to go directly to the shareholders by
means of a TOB, such strategies have been more aggressively pursued in recent years by
Japanese companies (e.g., Yumeshin) and certain shareholder activists (e.g., M&A
Consulting). However, even in cases where an acquirer can reach an agreement with
management, the TOB rules may still apply and thus should be an item that is included as
part of the overall consideration of a possible transaction.
(1)

TOB Rules

Many acquisitions of Japanese public companies technically begin with a tender
offer due to the mandatory TOB rules in Japan which apply irrespective of whether a
86

In the United States, we often refer to the “tender offer rules” under Regulations 14D and 14E of the
Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 et seq. Although Japanese securities law has historically
referred to U.S. securities law when making new rules and regulations, in this case it appears that the
English term “takeover bids” is the more favored expression amongst practitioners.

87

See generally THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 1.
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specific acquisition is friendly or hostile. As a general matter, an off-market acquisition
of shares requires compliance with the TOB rules if (a) an acquirer group purchases more
than five percent of the voting rights of the target company from more than ten sellers
within a period of 60 days or (ii) an acquirer group purchases more than one third of the
voting rights in the target company.88
Once the mandatory TOB rules are triggered, various disclosure and procedural
requirements apply to the transaction in a manner similar to U.S. practice. For instance,
under the TOB rules the tender offer period must be scheduled to last between 20
calendar days and 60 calendar days.89 There is no requirement that the tender offeror
must purchase all outstanding shares. Instead, the tender offeror usually sets the
minimum and/or maximum number of shares it will purchase.90 When the shares
tendered fall below the stated minimum, the tender offeror will not purchase any shares.
In cases where the shares tendered exceed the stated maximum, the tender offeror
purchases shares on a pro-rata basis. Although the TOB rules permit the use of securities
as consideration in tender offers, there have been relatively few instances of exchange

88

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 1. Note that the mandatory TOB rules do not apply
to an issuance of new shares, mergers and stock-for-stock exchanges. See id.; THE TENDER OFFER
REPORT, at 4; NISHIMURA & PARTNERS, M&A-HO TAIZEN [Corpus Juris M&A] 59-60 (2001).

89

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 2. The FSA has recently considered whether to
amend the rules from calendar days to business days, although no final action has yet taken place. See
THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 7.

90

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-13, para. 4.
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offers in Japan primarily due to the absence of tax rules which would permit tendering
shareholders to defer their capital gains in exchange offers.91
After the launch of a tender offer, the tender offeror may withdraw the offer only
for certain enumerated reasons as set forth in the TOB rules, such as an impending
merger, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and so forth.92 Additionally, under the
current TOBrules a tender offero r may not reduce the maximum number of shares to be
purchased or reduce its tender offer price. However, the FSA is considering possible
amendments to the TOB rules which would permit a tender offeror to reduce its tender
offer price in certain limited circumstances such as when the target company announces a
stock split as occurred in the Yumeshin bid for JEC.93
Another important point to take away from the Yumeshin bid is that compliance
with the applicable TOB rules is not always the end of the analysis. As you may recall,

91

In contrast to cash tender offers, the issuer of securities in an exchange offer in Japan may become
subject to disclosure obligations under the Securities and Exchange Law, which are comparable to the
registration statement requirements of the Securities Act and the continuing disclosure obligations of
the Exchange Act. See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-4, para. 1. In the recent Amendment to
the Securities and Exchange Law (which was enacted in December 2005, but will have an effective
date prior to March 2009 as yet to be determined), non-Japanese companies may submit Englishlanguage documents together with Japanese summaries thereof to satisfy the applicable disclosure
requirements in certain cases. See Supplementary Provisions of Securities and Exchange Law, Law
No. 76 of 2005, art. 1; art. 2. These changes to Japanese securities laws are expected to ease the
burden on non-Japanese companies that already have continuing disclosure obligations under
Japanese law.

92

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-11, para. 1. As noted previously, the FSA has recently
considered expanding the list of reasons for withdrawal of tender offers in response to an increase in
the defensive measures used by Japanese companies. See THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 8-9.

93

See id., at 9.
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in response to Yumeshin’s business alliance proposal, JEC announced a general
defensive policy which stated that defensive measures would be taken if an acquirer
attempted to continue purchasing shares prior to JEC’s review of any proposal submitted
by such acquirer. When Yumeshin launched a tender offer for JEC shares, JEC
subsequently announced an impending stock split which had the practical effect of
delaying the settlement date of the tender offer. Although the legality of such a defensive
tactic was upheld in the decision of the Tokyo District Court,94 the precise balance
between the interests of the target company and the tender offeror will likely remain a hot
topic in Japanese M&A law with possible amendments to the TOB rules being an
important development to monitor in the months and years ahead.
(2)

Proxy Contests

While proxy contests remain somewhat of a rare event in Japanese deals,95 they
do still occur and thus remain a possible option for the acquirer.96 For instance, in certain

94

See supra note 49.

95

Even in the United States, proxy contests are rare due to the effective results that can often be realized
in a well planned tender offer. Additionally, the high profile, costs and risks associated with staging a
proxy contest should not be underestimated. This said, the threat of an impending proxy contest has
long been a possible strategy for the acquirer. The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal observed this
organic and multifaceted nature to M&A strategies when noting, “[O]ur corporate law is not static. It
must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs…In
[prior cases], the tender offer, while not an unknown device, was virtually unused with their coercive
effects. Then, the favored attack of a raider was stock acquisition followed by a proxy contest.
Various defensive tactics, which provided no benefit whatever to the raider, evolved. Thus, the use of
corporate funds by management to counter a proxy battle was approved.” Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957.

96

See discussion of the M&A Consulting proxy contest for control of Tokyo Style Co., Ltd. in supra
note 53.
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cases the tender offeror may also wish to engage in or threaten a possible proxy contest as
an ancillary strategy against the target company. Specifically, the tender offeror may
consider a proxy contest when (a) its tender offer closes after the record date for
shareholders who may attend the next shareholders meeting of the target company or (b)
the tender offeror requires voting rights in excess of the stated maximum in its tender
offer in order to obtain control of the target company (e.g., the tender offeror purchases a
simple majority of target company shares through the tender offer, but needs a
supermajority of voting rights at the upcoming shareholders meeting in order to defeat
the incumbent board).
The Defensive Measures Guidelines briefly discuss these issues in noting that a
tender offer combined with a proxy contest would enhance the efficacy of a proxycontest
to cancel a rights plan.97 In dealing with such issues, the Defensive Measures Guidelines
recommend that a rights plan be redeemed by a vote at a single shareholders meeting.98
Unlike the United States, in Japan shark repellants such as staggered boards are not as
common a defensive strategy and thus Japanese companies should be able to follow this
recommendation without much difficulty.99 Accordingly, for a Japanese deal only one
97

See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 15-16. Note that the Defensive Measures Guidelines
prohibit dead hand poison pills. Specifically, the Defensive Measures Guidelines prohibit a rights
plan that cannot be redeemed: (i) if one of the directors who was a director at the time of the adoption
of such rights plan is replaced; (ii) unless a majority of directors at the time of adoption of such rights
plan is replaced; or (iii) for a certain period of time even if a majority of the directors is replaced. See
id. 16.

98

See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 9.

99

See the discussion of staggered boards at Section III.D(2) infra.
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proxy context may be sufficient to replace incumbent directors whereas it may be
necessary to have more than one proxy contest to take control of the board in the United
States.
C.

Triangular Mergers

As noted previously, one of the significant changes to come out of the new
Corporation Law are the provisions dealing with the expansion of cash-out and triangular
mergers.100 Specifically, these new provisions permit the acquirer as surviving company
in a merger to distribute cash and/or shares of another company (e.g., a non-Japanese
parent company of the acquirer) to the shareholders of the disappearing company.101 The
practical effect of these amendments to the Corporation Law is that for the first time nonJapanese entities may acquire all the shares of a Japanese public company through either
a forward triangular merger or a de facto reverse triangular merger without government
approval as required under Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization.
Provided below are descriptions of these two structures that one could expect to see once
the provisions of the new Corporation Law take effect in May 2007.

100

For a more detailed analysis of the new rules relating to triangular mergers, see Takefumi Sato &
Daisuke Matsubara, Cash-out option means more M&A flexibility, The IFLR Guide to Japan 2006,
International Financial Law Review, Jan. 2006, at 21-25.

101

See Corporation Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2; art. 768, para. 1, no. 2. Additionally, the surviving
entity may also distribute other assets such as share purchase warrants and bonds. See Corporation
Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2; art. 768, para. 1, no. 2
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(1)
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The Corporation Law does not permit mergers between Japanese companies and
non-Japanese companies and the amendments to the new Corporation Law have not
changed these provisions. Accordingly, in order to utilize the new rules permitting
various forms of consideration in cross-border transactions, the non-Japanese acquirer
must first either create or own a Japanese acquisition vehicle which will hold the cash
and/or shares of the non-Japanese acquirer that will serve as the consideration for the
transaction. A forward triangular merger results when the target company merges into
the acquisition vehicle and the non-Japanese acquirer causes such acquisition vehicle to
distribute cash and/or the shares to the target company shareholders.
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(2)

De Facto Reverse Triangular Merger
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The de facto reverse triangular merger largely resembles a forward triangular with
the significant structural difference being that, instead of a merger of the target company
into the acquisition vehicle as is the case in a forward triangular merger, in a de facto
reverse triangular merger the acquisition vehicle and target company conduct a stock-forstock exchange whereby the acquisition vehicle acquirers all of target company shares by
operation of law.102 Thus, the acquisition vehicle and target company will enter into a
stock-for-stock exchange agreement which will provide that non-Japanese acquirer cash
and/or stock will serve as the consideration for the acquisition of all target company
shares. As noted previously, the stock-for-stock exchange will generally require a
Supermajority Vote of each of the acquisition vehicle and target company shareholders.
After the completion of the stock-for-stock exchange, the target company will become a

102

See Corporation Law, art. 767; art. 768.
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wholly owned subsidiary of the acquisition vehicle. In order to complete the de facto
reverse triangular merger, the acquisition vehicle will then merge into the target company,
which will result in the target company becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of the nonJapanese acquirer. The primary benefits of this structure is that, similar to a reverse
triangular merger in the United States, it will enable (i) the target company to remain the
surviving company, (ii) the non-Japanese acquirer to own all of the target company
shares, and (iii) target company shareholders to receive cash and/or shares of the nonJapanese acquirer.
(3)

Effective Date of the Amendments

Although the triangular merger amendments to the Corporation Law were
requested by certain Japanese business interests, the effective date for these amendments
has been delayed until May 2007, which will be precisely one year after the other
provisions of the new Corporate Law come into effect. However, these same triangular
merger structures can be used prior to May 2007 in the event that the Law on Special
Measures for Industrial Revitalization (the “Industrial Revitalization Law”) applies to the
transaction. The Industrial Revitalization Law, a special purpose law thatis expected to
continue for a limited period of time, is a result of the legislative initiatives of METI
which seek to enhance the productivity of certain Japanese industries.103 In a transaction

103

An English summary of the recent amendment of the Industrial Revitalization Law, which includes
the provisions on triangular mergers, is available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/business_infra/
downloadfiles/3-4.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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subject to the Industrial Revitalization Law, the approval of a competent government
minister is required as part of the application to be filed with the proper authorities. This
approval is provided under certain enumerated conditions,104 and in recent years there
have been a number of MBO and LBO transactions which received the necessary
approvals under the Industrial Revitalization Law.105
(4)

Tax Treatment

One reason why it is anticipated that U.S. companies would prefer using a
triangular merger structure when acquiring a Japanese company is their ability to access
the U.S. capital markets in financing Japanese deals.106 While the triangular merger
amendments will permit stock deals in the manner described above, at the present time
there are no tax laws which provide incentives to non-Japanese companies along the lines
of the tax free reorganization rules for triangular mergers that currently apply in the
104

Among other requirements, a transaction must fall within one of the following categories in order to
be approved: (i) a “self-restructuring plan”, (ii) a “business transfer and restart plan”, or (iii) a “corestructuring plan.” Takefumi Sato & Daisuke Matsubara, Cash-out option means more M&A
flexibility, at 23-24.

105

For instance, The Carlyle Group acquired KITO Corporation, a manufacturer of material handling
equipment, in 2003 through an LBO which was the first cash-out merger under the Industrial
Revitalization Law. For a discussion of the various issues associated with going-private transactions
under the Industrial Revitalization Law, see generally Hiroshi Uchima & Masaki Noda, Going Private
no Hoteki Shuho to Ryuiten [Legal Structures and Issues of Going Private], 1675 Shoji Homu 81
(2003); Tatsuya Tanigawa & Mihoko Fukuzawa, Sangyosaiseiho wo Riyoshita Going Private no
Jitsumu [Practice of Going Private under the Industrial Revitalization Law], 1676 Shoji Homu 22
(2003).

106

The Corporate Value Study Report noted that the aggregate amount of market capital of corporations
listed on the first division of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is approximately $3.1 trillion (when
assuming that one dollar is equal to 110 yen) as of August 2004, whereas the comparable figure for
the New York Stock Exchange is $12.3 trillion as of August 2004. See THE CORPORATE VALUE
STUDY REPORT, at 15.

44
Doing Deals in Japan.doc

United States.107 In order to harmonize the rules on triangular mergers in the United
States and Japan and facilitate more cross-border transactions in the future it would be
desirable if the necessary amendments to Japanese tax laws were considered in concert
with the scheduled changes to take effect in May 2007. In the absence of such changes to
Japanese tax law, the effective cost of capital in a Japanese triangular merger may be
considerably higher than in a similar transaction that qualifies as a tax free reorganization
in the United States. Such increased financing costs may ultimately be shouldered by the
surviving business and become an issue for further negotiation between the parties as the
case may be, and thus bringing more closely together the objectives of Japanese corporate
and tax law is a goal worth pursuing.
(5)

Appraisal Rights

The new Corporation Law has also amended the provisions relating to the
appraisal rights of shareholders in, inter alia, a merger (for forward triangular mergers) or
a stock-for-stock exchange (for de facto reverse triangular mergers). In particular, the
amendments provide that the appraisal price must be a “fair price” which would include
any synergies arising from the deal.108 Under prior law, the appraisal price did not

107

For a discussion of the tax issues associated with transactions under the Industrial Revitalization Law,
see Yo Ota & Tatsuya Tanigawa, Japan’s New M&A Measures Open Door for Tax Benefits, 30 Tax
Notes International 887 (2003).

108

See Corporation Law, art. 785, para. 1; art. 797, para. 1; art. 806, para. 1. See also Kenjiro Egashira,
Kaisha Hosei no Gendaika ni kansuru Yokoan (V) [Commentary on Draft Outline of Modernization
of Corporation Law System (V)], 1725 Shoji Homu 4, 9 (2005). Precisely how a court would
determine the value of any perceived synergies remains an unresolved issue.
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include any possible valuation effects of the merger or the stock-for-stock exchange on
the relevant shares of the surviving company. In contrast to Delaware,109 there is no
market-out rule in Japan and thus appraisal rights are granted even if the stock used as
consideration in the merger or stock-for-stock exchange is publicly traded. Thus, future
developments in Japanese case law concerning the appropriate methods to calculate fair
price in the appraisal context should be a matter that is monitored on a consistent basis.
D.

Defensive Measures

In response to the increase in hostile deal activity in Japan, we have seen a
marked increase in the defensive measures being considered by Japanese companies in
order to forestall any would be corporate raiders. These actions by possible target
companies began in earnest when the Livedoor hostile bid for NBS was on the front
pages of Japanese newspapers. In this respect, as a consequence of Livedoor, many
Japanese companies suddenly viewed themselves as more susceptible to takeovers. Since
the precise extent to which Japanese companies can properly employ defensive measures
is still an evolving area of law, we have outlined below some of the main points that can
be observed at present.

109

See Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 262(b)(1), (2) (2005).
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(1)

Japanese Rights Plans

The most significant new defensive measure used by Japanese companies and the
one that has justifiably received the most attention and scrutiny is the use of rights plans,
typically through the issuance of share purchase warrants (shinkabu-yoyaku-ken).110 The
Defensive Measures Guidelines have provided the most recent guidance on the extent to
which Japanese companies should be able to adopt rights plans, especially through the
issuance of share purchase warrants, with the hope that such rules will prevail in practice
although they do not have the force of law in a strict sense. As a result, some Japanese
companies have adopted rights plans under the Defensive Measures Guidelines while
others have not. The various legal issues concerning rights plans have been analyzed
intensively since Livedoor case. What we have seen is what one might expect in these
circumstances—much variety and flexibility across the market with companies adopting
rights plans that are tailored to address the particular issues associated with their
businesses. Although the specific terms and conditions of each of these rights plans may
differ, as a legal matter the poison pills in Japan that are presently being used by target
companies can be roughly categorized into four types, three of which involve the
issuance of share purchase warrants.
•

Prior Warning Pills. In this type of poison pill, as a general matter the
target company issues a public warning by announcing that any potential

110

See note 6 supra regarding the use of the terms rights plans and poison pills in this article.
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acquirers must (i) submit certain information in order for the target
company to evaluate their acquisition proposal and (ii) refrain from
purchasing target company shares until the evaluation of such acquisition
proposal is reasonably completed. In the event that the acquirer fails to
comply with such procedures or, in some cases, the target company
believes that the acquisition will significantly decrease corporate value,
then the target company will take certain defensive measures.111 The
general defensive policy announced by JEC in response to Yumeshin’s
proposed business alliance is an example of a prior warning pill. Prior
warning pills are also sometimes used in conjunction with other types of
defensive measures as part of a company’s entire defensive profile.112

111

In some cases, a target company simply announces its evaluation of an acquisition proposal and only
asks its shareholders to reject a tender offer (i.e., the target company does not take additional
defensive measures), which remains the case as long as the acquirer complies with procedures
required by the target company. See MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., MATSUSHITA
ANNOUNCES PLANS TO MAXIMIZE SHAREHOLDER VALUE (Apr. 28, 2005), http://panasonic.co.jp/corp/
news/official.data/data.dir/en050428-8/en050428-8.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).

112

For example, Nippon Steel Corporation announced on March 29, 2006 that (i) it adopted a prior
warning pill, (ii) Nippon Steel Corporation, Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. and Kobe Steel, Ltd.
signed a memorandum of understanding “which ensures the process for the three companies to
cooperatively study the impacts on the strategic alliance and countermeasures in the event that an
unsolicited offer is made to one of the three companies", and (iii) "the three companies have
purchased the shares of each other.” See NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, PROGRESS IN TIE-UP
MEASURES BY NIPPON STEEL, SUMITOMO METALS AND KOBE STEEL, AND AGREEMENT ON FURTHER
ENHANCEMENT OF COOPERATION 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www0.nsc.co.jp/data/
20060329120934.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006); NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, NIPPON STEEL
ANNOUNCES THE ADOPTION OF FAIR RULES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDINGS
(TAKEOVER DEFENSE MEASURE) AND THE SHELF REGISTRATION OF STOCK ACQUISITION RIGHTS 1
(Mar. 29, 2006), http://www0.nsc.co.jp/data/20060330115130.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
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•

Trust Pills. In the past year, a number of Japanese companies have issued
so-called trust pills.113 The key point for trust pills is the use of an
intermediary, usually a trust, between the issuer and the shareholders. In
trust pills, the target company usually issues the share purchase warrants
to the trust without consideration and with an exercise price of nominal
value. Depending on the specific terms of the trust pill, upon the
occurrence of certain trigger events (e.g., crossing a percentage ownership
threshold by a hostile bidder) the trust will distribute the share purchase
warrants to target company shareholders. The hostile bidder, however,
will not be able to exercise the warrants it receives, which results in the
dilution effects of the poison pill.114

•

Conditional Issuance Pills. Here, instead of issuing the share purchase
warrants without delay, the target company may conditionally resolve to
issue (or resolve to conditionally issue) the warrants without consideration
at a nominal price to shareholders. This conditional resolution or issuance
takes effect only upon the occurrence of certain triggering events as in the

113

For example, Wood One Co., Ltd., Seino Transportation Co., Ltd., and Pentax Corporation.

114

Note that Japanese law does not permit Japanese companies to attach an option right to their shares.
This is a critical point since share purchase warrants are not transferred upon a subsequent sale by
shareholders of their underlying shares, while in the U.S. the rights “stick” to the shares in question.
See generally Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 157(a). This unique aspect of share purchase warrants poses
numerous issues under the Corporation Law and applicable U.S. securities laws as further discussed
infra.
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case with trust pills, with all shareholders except the hostile bidder given
the right to exercise the warrants.
•

Limited Voting Right Pills. This pill can be adopted under the new
Corporation Law.115 Limited voting right pills permit a company to
convert its common shares to limited voting right shares by amending its
articles of incorporation, and as part of such conversion the hostile
acquirer will be excluded from voting such limited voting right shares in
the future.

While some Japanese companies have adopted prior warning and/or trust pills, one
should note that there were no cases where Japanese companies adopted conditional
issuance or limited voting right pills in 2005. Furthermore, it is anticipated that at the
upcoming annual shareholders meetings in June 2006 more Japanese companies will
adopt poison pills, which may serve as a barometer on the development of market
practices.116 Thus, it appears that Japanese poison pills will continue to evolve in the
near future and remain a matter of intense discussion among practitioners.

115

See Corporation Law, art. 322, para. 1, no. 1(ii); art. 108, para. 2, no. 3.

116

For most Japanese companies, the fiscal year ends on March 31. As a result, the month of June is the
most active month for shareholders meetings in Japan.
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(2)

Other Notable Defensive Measures

In addition to share purchase warrants, there are other defensive measures that a
Japanese company can take which will be familiar to the U.S. practitioner. At the same
time, there are certain strategies that are common in the U.S. which are not frequently
used in Japan, and thus provided below is a description of selected defensive measures
that do and do not work in Japanese deals.
•

Dividend Increases. Japanese target companies can use dividend increases
as a defensive measure to counter the efforts of hostile acquirers. In cases
where the target company can expect that an increase in dividends will
result in a higher stock price, such a strategy may work in pushing the
stock price above the hostile bidder’s price in the context of a tender offer.
This approach was successfully taken in two notable deals from a few
years ago which involved Steel Partners, the U.S. investment fund.117

117

In December 2003, Steel Partners launched a hostile tender offer for shares of Sotoh Co., Ltd.
(“Sotoh”), a texture dyeing company. Although a white knight launched a competing tender offer,
Steel Partners’ final price (1,550 yen per share) was higher than that of the white knight. In response
to these developments, Sotoh announced that it would increase its dividend from 6.5 yen to 193.5 yen
per share. The market price of Sotoh shares increased from 1,590 yen to 1,800 yen per share, and
thereafter the Steel Partners tender offer failed. Around the same time in December 2003, Steel
Partners launched a hostile tender offer for shares of Yushiro Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. (“Yushiro”)
at 1,150 yen per share. Yushiro announced that it would increase its dividend from 11 yen to 192 yen
per share. The market price of Yushiro shares increased to about 1,600 – 1,900 yen from a previous
1,156 yen per share before the announcement. The result was the same: the Steel Partners tender offer
failed.
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•

Stock splits. As demonstrated in the Yumeshin – JEC deal, stock splits
can be effective defensive measures in tender offers by delaying the
settlement date of the tender offer, which will make the tender offer less
attractive to shareholders and the tender offeror. In the case of JEC’s
stock split, this resulted in the delay of the tender offer settlement by 56
days. However, as a result of recent amendments to the Tokyo Stock
Exchange rules, the maximum delay period has effectively become
approximately 50 days.118

•

Staggered boards. In contrast to U.S. practice, staggered boards are
usually not an effective strategy in Japanese deals. This is because the
maximum term of directors is two years under Japanese law, whereas in
Delaware the directors can be separated into three classes with three-year
terms.119 Thus, a staggered board for a Japanese company can only delay
the hostile acquirer for approximately one year. Additionally, the
Defensive Measures Guidelines recommend that a company provide
directors with one-year terms when the company in question has adopted a
rights plan that lasts longer than one year so that shareholders can
indirectly approve the rights plan annually when voting on the slate of

118

See Yo Ota, Nihon Gijutsu Kaihatsu no Kabushiki Bunkatsu Sashitome Karishobun Meirei Moshitate
Jiken [Preliminary Injunction Case of Enjoinment of Stock Split of JEC], 1742 Shoji Homu 42, 44; 52
(2005).

119

See Corporation Law, art. 332, para. 1; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(d).
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directors.120 Furthermore, another reason for the ineffectiveness of
staggered boards in Japan is that it is possible to dismiss directors at
shareholders meetings without cause.121
•

Supermajority voting requirements. In a manner similar to staggered
boards, the use of supermajority voting requirements are not a commonly
used defensive strategy in Japanese deals. Unlike in Delaware where the
default rule is that a majority of outstanding shares can approve a merger
although this threshold may be increased as provided in the certificate of
incorporation,122 Japanese law generally requires a Supermajority Vote for
mergers or other significant corporate actions.123 The new Corporation
Law permits Japanese companies to increase this supermajority vote
requirement by amending the articles of incorporation, but it is not
possible to decrease the requirement to a majority of the outstanding
shares as is the case in Delaware.124 However, one area where the new

120

See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 9; 12; 19.

121

See Corporation Law, art. 339, para. 1; art. 339, para. 2 (indemnification may be available to a
director who was dismissed without cause). In Delaware, the general rule is that any director may be
removed with or without cause, although removal without cause may not be possible in certain cases
when the corporation has elected to classify its board or have cumulative voting. See Del. Gen. Corp.
Law §141(k).

122

See Del Gen. Corp. Law §§ 102(b)(4), 251(c).

123

See Corporation Law, art. 309, para. 2.

124

See Corporation Law, art. 309, para. 2.
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Corporation Law does provide for a simple majority vote is in the
dismissal of directors with or without cause, which may be increased by
amendment to the articles of incorporation.125
(3)

Emerging Issues: Special Committee of Directors

As a corollary to the increase in defensive measures employed by Japanese
companies, an issue that has received additional attention of late is the extent to which a
special committee of directors should be formed in order to review and consider
proposals from hostile bidders. In takeovers under Delaware law, special committees are
often used when there is a question as to the independence of target company directors.
This will often occur in going private transactions or when a controlling shareholder of
the target is the acquirer. In such cases, the entire fairness test as enunciated by the
Delaware courts will most likely apply to the transaction that is subject to judicial
review.126 The Delaware special committee process, therefore, is often used in
furtherance of satisfying the requirements of the entire fairness test127 since a well
125

See Corporation Law, art. 341.

126

“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements
that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. However, the test for fairness is not a
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a
whole since the question is one of entire fairness.” Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638
A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994), quoting, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). See
also Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 144(a)(3).

127

See id.
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planned and executed special committee process can shift the burden of proof to plaintiff
shareholders in future litigation proceedings.128
Special committees in Japan share many of the aspects that one usually finds in a
special committee that operates under Delaware law, with the interest of maintaining
independence in the decision-making process playing a fundamental role.129 However,
one key difference between current practices in Japan and Delaware is that under present
Japanese law there are no clear prudential standards for reviewing the decisions of target
boards. A consequence of the continuing development of Japanese law is that the special
committee process is evolving in parallel with the consideration of new defensive
measures.
At the present time, special committees are most often used when a Japanese
company adopts a rights plan. A customary example is when, as part of the
announcement of a rights plan, a Japanese company will require that activation and
cancellation of the rights plan be determined by the board of directors that “assigns
maximum value to the recommendations” of a special committee.130 In contrast to the
128

“Particular consideration must be given to evidence of whether the special committee was truly
independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm’s length.” Id. 638 A.2d at 11201121.

129

See THE CORPORATE VALUE REPORT, at 91-94.

130

LION CORPORATION, NOTICE CONCERNING THE ISSUANCE OF SUBSCRIPTION RIGHTS IN PREPARATION
FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A TRUST-TYPE RIGHTS PLAN, at 7 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.lion.co.jp/
en/press/html/2006009f.htm; SEINO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD., ISSUANCE OF STOCK ACQUISITION
RIGHTS FOR A TRUST-TYPE RIGHTS PLAN 10 (May 17, 2005), http://www.seino.co.jp/seino/e/news/
pdf/17may2005-01.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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customary practice in the United States, in Japan the members of the special committee
are not only directors of the target company, but may also include independent statutory
auditors or outside advisors such as legal counsel.131 The concerns related to maintaining
the necessary independence of the special committee process are present in Japan as is
the case in the U.S. experience,132 and such issues have resonated with investors and led
some to vote against rights plans where the special committee was not considered
sufficiently independent from management.133
Given this evolving nature of special committees in Japanese deals, we will likely
see additional changes in the manner in which special committees are constituted and
operated in the coming years.
E.

U.S. Federal Securities Laws

In addition to Japanese law considerations, practitioners should keep in mind the
possible implications of U.S. securities laws when doing Japanese deals. In particular,

131

See LION CORPORATION, id. at 7; SEINO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD., id. at 9.

132

Defining “independence” is a well known issue for U.S. practitioners in complying with the new
corporate governance rules and regulations that came into effect after the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10A-3; NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02; NASD Manual
Rules 4200(a)(15), 4350(c).

133

For example, it is reported that the Pension Fund Association voted against rights plans proposed by
two companies at their respective shareholders meetings in 2005 because of their dissatisfaction with
the independence of special committee members in one case and the authority given to the special
committee in making decisions for the corporation in the other. See The Yomiuri Shimbun, Poison
Pill Donyu Hantai no Case [Cases of Objecting to the Introduction of Poison Pills], Morning Edition
of July 7, 2005, at 9, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/mnews/20050707mh05.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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given the globalization of both institutional and individual investment, securities of
Japanese issuers that have never been listed on an exchange outside of Japan are
frequently beneficially owned by persons resident in the U.S. Thus, a deal with a
Japanese issuer may trigger various requirements under U.S. securities laws. This section
provides guidance for structuring M&A transactions in compliance with U.S. securities
laws, reviews the consequences for violating such laws, and also examines the potential
impact of U.S. securities laws on Japanese rights plans.
(1)

Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Japanese Business
Combinations and Tender Offers

The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) regulates offers and sales of
securities in the U.S. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act, issuers must file a
registration statement in respect of securities offered and sold in the U.S. or comply with
an exemption from the registration requirement.134 “Offer” and “sale” include proposals
to U.S. security holders requiring a vote on whether to accept new or different securities
in exchange for their existing securities.135 The three typical Japanese business
combination structures (gappei or mergers, kabushiki kokan or stock-for-stock
exchanges, and kabushiki iten or stock transfers) generally require approval by the
shareholders who will receive new or different securities as a result of the transaction and

134

See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1997).

135

See § 77b(a)(3).
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are therefore subject to the Securities Act when U.S. holders are asked to vote on the
transaction.136
Section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934137 (the “Exchange Act”) and
the rules promulgated thereunder provide detailed disclosure, procedural and filing
requirements regarding tender offers for securities registered under the Exchange Act.
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act138 and the rules promulgated thereunder create
procedural rules for all tender offers made in the U.S. Moreover, Section 13(e) of the
Exchange Act139 and the rules promulgated thereunder set forth additional rules
applicable to all issuer tender offers and going private transactions conducted in the U.S.
Any tender offer made with respect to shares held by U.S. persons or shares registered
with the SEC must therefore comply with these requirements, as applicable, unless it falls
within an exemption from the Exchange Act tender offer requirements.
An entity seeking to acquire the shares of a foreign private issuer140 through a
business combination or tender offer can nonetheless avoid the requirements of the
136

See Sections III.A.3, 6 & 7, supra, for a discussion of gappei, kabushiki kokan and kabushiki iten. In
the case of a cash-out merger or cash-out stock for stock exchange, the offeror does not make an offer
or sale of securities to the target company shareholders, and the Securities Act is therefore not
applicable. However, note that the Corporation Law does not permit cash-out mergers in the manner
provided under Delaware law. See supra note 8.

137

15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1997).

138

§ 78n(e).

139

§ 78m(e).

140

A foreign private issuer is any issuer not organized under the laws of the U.S., provided that more
than 50 percent of its outstanding voting securities are not owned by U.S. residents and: (i) less than
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Securities Act and Exchange Act by excluding U.S. holders from the transaction or, in
the case of a tender offer where part of the consideration is securities (i.e., an exchange
offer), offering U.S. holders only the cash proceeds of shares pursuant to a so-called
vendor placement.141 As discussed below, these alternatives are frequently impractical or
prohibited under Japanese laws. Therefore, the Cross Border Rules which are exceptions
to the general requirements of the Securities Act and Exchange Act,142 are the primary
means by which U.S. shareholders can be included in Japanese tender offers and business
combinations.143

half of the executive officers or directors of the issuer are U.S. citizens or residents; (ii) more than 50
percent of the assets of the issuer are not located in the U.S.; or (iii) the U.S. is not the issuer’s
primary place of business. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2004).
141

In the context of a business combination or tender offer in which securities make up part of the
consideration, Japanese issuers could also issue shares to U.S. holders pursuant to a private placement
under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act or register the shares to be issued to U.S. holders with the
SEC. However, a private placement is often impractical because the issuer is required to know in
advance that all U.S. persons who receive the offer are qualified under the Securities Act to participate
in a private placement. Registering shares with the SEC is also frequently impractical because of the
time and expense involved and the triggering of ongoing Securities Act reporting requirements. For a
comprehensive analysis of the application of U.S. securities laws to non-U.S. transactions, see
Stephen D. Bohrer, The Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Overseas Business Transactions, 11
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 126 (2005).

142

See Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 7759, Exchange Act Release No. 42054, 60 Fed. Reg. 61,382 (Oct. 26,
1999) (hereinafter, the “Cross Border Release”).

143

“[T]he Commission is adopting exemptive rules that are intended to encourage issuers and bidders to
extend tender and exchange offers . . . and business combinations to the U.S. security holders of
foreign private issuers.” Id. at 61,382.
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(i)

Exclusion of U.S. shareholders

Offerors can avoid SEC jurisdiction over a business combination or tender offer
by excluding U.S. holders from the offer or sale.144 Offerors’ ability to take this approach
depends on whether, under the laws of their own jurisdictions, some shareholders may be
excluded from the offer and whether the offeror can win approval for the transaction
without the votes of U.S. shareholders. This approach would also require that the
transaction be structured and documented in a way that made it clear that no offer was
being made in the U.S.145
The exclusion of U.S. holders is not likely to be permitted in Japanese business
combinations because the Corporation Law requires that all shareholders of a class be
treated equally.146 This rule is most likely interpreted to require that shareholders of a

144

See id. at 61,383 (discussing the possibility that notwithstanding the adoption of the Cross Border
Rules, some non-U.S. issuers will continue to exclude U.S. holders from participation in business
combinations).

145

The Securities Act definitions of “offer to sell,” “offer for sale,” and “offer” include “every attempt or
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security
or interest in a security, for value.” § 77b(a)(3). “Tender Offer” is not specifically defined in the
Exchange Act or rules promulgated thereunder. However, tender offers are generally characterized by
eight factors: “(i) an active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders is made for shares of an
issuer; (ii) the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (iii) the offer to
purchase is made at a premium above the prevailing market price; (iv) the terms of the offer are firm
rather than negotiable; (v) the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of shares
and is often subject to a ceiling of a fixed maximum number of shares to be purchased; (vi) the offer
is open for only a limited period of time; (vii) offerees are subject to pressure to sell their stock; and
(viii) public announcements of an acquisition program precede or accompany the accumulation of
stock.” MEREDITH M. BROWN, ET AL., TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS § 4-2.A. (2d ed. 2004).

146

Corporation Law, art. 109, para. 1 (“A stock company must treat shareholders equally in accordance
with content and the number of shares owned by them”).
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class be offered identical consideration in a business combination or tender offer, and not
just consideration of equal value.
In the context of an exchange offer, to ensure that no offer is made in the U.S.,
documents concerning the transaction should not be disseminated in or otherwise sent to
the U.S and offerors should obtain undertakings from nominees not to send any such
documents into the U.S. Moreover, offerors should not accept tenders from U.S. persons
and require all tendering shareholders to certify that they did not receive any documents
in the U.S. Japanese registration statements announcing a cash tender offer often contain
a legend indicating that the acquirer does not intend to make the offer in the U.S.147
However, as indicated in Section III.B.1. above, exchange offers are rare in Japan due to
unfavorable tax treatment.
(ii)

Vendor Placements

The SEC has taken the position that if a foreign issuer offers and issues to U.S.
residents securities as consideration in a tender offer that are immediately resold outside
the United States for the account of the U.S. residents, there is no offer or sale made to

147

The following is a typical legend: “Shareholders residing overseas need to offer their shares through
their standing agents in Japan. This tender offer does not intend to, directly or indirectly, be made in
or towards the United States, and is not carried by use of the mails in the United States or in any other
interstate commerce in the United States or international commerce nor by use of any facilities of a
national securities exchange in the United Sates.” For an analysis of the legality of such legends
under the Securities and Exchange Law, see Tatsuya Tanigawa & Mihoko Fukuzawa, Sangyosaiseiho
wo Riyoshita Going Private no Jitsumu [Practice of Going Private under the Industrial Revitalization
Law], at 27.
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the U.S. residents for purposes of the Securities Act.148 In such transactions, this “vendor
placement” technique works as follows: (i) U.S. holders of target company securities
receive the same offer as was made to all target shareholders; (ii) a U.S. holder’s
acceptance of the offer is deemed an agreement to have the acquiring company’s shares
that would otherwise be issued to such U.S. holder be issued instead to a trustee located
outside the United States; (iii) upon receiving shares from the acquiring company, the
trustee promptly resells them outside the United States; and (iv) following such resale,
the trustee remits the cash proceeds, less expenses, to the U.S. holder.149 However, the
SEC has permitted this approach in only limited circumstances, and has not codified the
process, but rather signaled that it will evaluate the availability of vendor placements on a
case by case basis.150
Vendor placements are typically not a useful means to avoid U.S. jurisdiction in
Japanese exchange offers because under Japanese law shareholders cannot be forced to
accept different forms of consideration in a given transaction.151 Accordingly, where a

148

See, e.g., Singapore Telecommunications Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 533462 (May 15,
2001); TABCORP Holdings Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 766087 (August 27, 1999);
Durban Roodepoort Deep, Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 1578786 (February 23, 1999);
AMP Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 870709 (September 17, 1998); Cross Border Release,
at 61,386.

149

See id.

150

See Cross Border Release, at Note 38.

151

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 3.
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target company’s shares are owned by U.S. and Japanese shareholders, the acquirer is not
permitted to offer cash to U.S. shareholders and stock to Japanese shareholders.
(2)

The Cross Border Rules - Rule 802

Rule 802 of the Securities Act exempts from registration (i) exchange offers for
the securities of foreign private issuers and (ii) exchanges of the securities of foreign
private issuers in any business combination, provided the conditions discussed below are
met.152
(i)

10% Ownership Test

In a gappei (merger) or kabushiki kokan (stock-for-stock exchange), less than
10% of the security holders of the target company may be resident in the U.S.153 In a
kabushiki iten (stock transfer), the percentage of shares held by U.S. holders for the
purpose of determining the availability of Rule 802 should be based on the ownership of
shares of the successor company on a pro forma basis immediately following the
transaction.154

152

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.802 (2004). An exchange offer is a tender offer in which securities constitute
part of the consideration, see id. at § 230.800(c), and a business combination is “a statutory
amalgamation, merger, arrangement or other reorganization requiring the vote of security holders of
one or more of the participating companies.” Id. at § 230.800(a). As noted in Section III.B.1 supra,
exchange offers are generally not conducted in Japan due to unfavorable tax treatment.

153

The 10% calculation is based on the specific instructions set forth in the regulations. See §
230.800(h).

154

See § 230.802(a).
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Securities that are convertible or exchangeable into the securities that are subject
to the offer are excluded from the 10% ownership calculation.155 Securities owned by
owners of more than 10% of the subject securities and securities owned by the offeror are
also excluded from the calculation of U.S. ownership.156
The ownership calculation should be made with respect to the shareholders of
record 30 days prior to the commencement of the offer.157 However, offerors may depart
from the 30-day standard when they are limited in their access to security holder list
information prepared periodically by third parties. 158 In such instances the offeror may
determine the percentage of U.S. holders of the shares subject to the offer by reference to
the latest security holder list available, unless the offeror has access to more accurate
information.159 Since Japanese companies typically receive their shareholder lists from
the depositary at fixed intervals and cannot otherwise obtain the shareholder lists unless
undergoing a capital structure change, the companies are usually required to utilize this
exception to the 30-day rule.

155

See § 230.802(b)(1).

156

See § 230.800(h)(2).

157

See § 230.800(h)(1).

158

See Division of Corporate Finance: Third Supplement to the Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations, Cross-Border Release (Supp. Jul. 2001), Part E, Question 9.

159

See id.
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In order to make the 10% ownership determination, the offeror must “look
through” record ownership in the target company’s home jurisdiction and in the U.S.
when the target company’s shares are held by brokers, dealers, banks or other nominees,
and determine the number of shares held in accounts with such nominees by U.S.
holders.160 To the extent the offeror is unable to determine beneficial ownership after a
reasonable inquiry, it may assume that the beneficial owners of securities held by
nominees are residents of the jurisdiction in which the nominee has its principal place of
business.161 The reasonable inquiry standard is not defined in SEC rules or guidance.
However, it normally requires that the offeror ask each nominee that is located in the
target company’s home jurisdiction or the U.S. how many shares it is holding for the
accounts of customers resident in the U.S.162
Provided not more than 10% of the target company’s securities are held by U.S.
holders when a bidder commences an offer, a competing offeror need not abide by the
10% U.S. ownership requirement.163 Thus, if securities move into the U.S. after the
initial offer such that more than 10% of the securities subject to the offer are owned by
U.S. holders, later bids are not foreclosed by the 10% ownership test.
160

See § 230.800(h)(3).

161

See § 230.800(h)(4).

162

See Equant N.V., SEC No Action Letter, 2005 WL 1173099 (April 18, 2004). In Equant, the SEC
approved an inquiry where the issuer retained an agent to conduct an investigation into the beneficial
holders of the issuers’ shares. The agent obtained a list of holders from the depositary and sent
informational requests regarding beneficial ownership to each of the nominees on the list.

163

See § 230.802(a); 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-1(c)(1) (2004). See also Cross Border Release, at 61,384.
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(ii)

Equal Treatment

U.S. holders must be allowed to participate in the exchange offer or business
combination on at least an equal basis with other holders. However, offerors are
permitted to offer U.S. holders cash-only consideration, even when non-U.S. holders are
offered securities, provided the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe the value of the
cash is substantially equivalent to the value of the securities.164 Nonetheless, as noted
previously, this exception to the Rule 802 equal treatment requirement is precluded by
the Corporation Law.165
(iii)

Documentary Requirements

An English translation of any informational document the offeror publishes or
disseminates to the target company’s security holders in connection with the transaction
must be furnished to the SEC on Form CB not later than the next business day following
publication or dissemination.166 “Informational document” is not defined in the rules or
guidance. Relevant factors in evaluating whether a disclosure constitutes an
informational document may include (i) whether the disclosure is required in the offeror’s
home jurisdiction, (ii) whether it formally commences the offer, (iii) whether it is
164

See § 230.802(a)(2).

165

See Corporation Law, art. 109, para. 1.

166

See § 230.802(a)(3). Per Regulation S, if no offer or sale is made in the U.S. (i.e., the target company
has no U.S. shareholders) there is no Securities Act registration requirement, and hence no need to
comply with the Rule 802 Securities Act registration exemption. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 et seq.
(2004).
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addressed to security holders, (iv) whether it gives security holders the means to tender
shares and (v) whether it otherwise gives shareholders material information about the
offer that they have not already received.167
(iv)

Parties Responsible for Filing Form CB

Pursuant to Rule 802, in an acquisition, the acquirer (or “issuer”) is required to
furnish informational documents disseminated to the shareholders of the target (or
“subject”) company to the SEC on Form CB.168 This allocation of responsibility is
consistent with U.S. securities laws regarding exchange offers and business combinations
which require an acquiring company to send the prospectus/proxy statement to target
company shareholders. However, in a Japanese business combination, the target
company, rather than the acquirer, typically distributes informational documents
concerning the transaction to its own shareholders.
(v)

Dissemination

An informational document is deemed to have been published or otherwise
disseminated if it is made public in any manner, such as via press release, the Internet or
direct mailing.169 Informational documents published or otherwise disseminated to

167

See Cross Border Release, at 61,385, 61,391.

168

See § 230.802(a)(3)(i).

169

See § 230.802(a)(3)(i), (ii); Cross Border Release, at 61,391, 61,394.
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shareholders in the offeror’s home jurisdiction must be translated into English and
disseminated to U.S. holders on a comparable basis to the means by which they were
provided to security holders in the offeror’s home jurisdiction.170 When the offeror
disseminates an informational document in its home jurisdiction by means of
“publication” (e.g., a press release via media outlets or a newspaper advertisement) rather
than sending the informational document directly to security holders, the offeror must
publish the information in the U.S. in a manner reasonably calculated to inform U.S.
holders of the relevant information.171 The rule does not specify what method of
dissemination satisfies this requirement.172 However, the adopting release makes clear
that the dissemination requirement is not satisfied by posting materials on the Internet.173
The rule does not clearly identify exactly when during the course of a transaction
the requirement to furnish and disseminate begins and ends. However, Japanese
companies often file the following documents in English on Form CB when
disseminating such documents to shareholders in Japan: (i) press release issued upon the

170

See § 230.802(a)(3)(ii).

171

See § 230.802(a)(3)(iii).

172

The SEC generally does not impose greater dissemination requirements with respect to U.S. holders
than are imposed by the home country jurisdiction. For example, an issuer can satisfy its Rule 802
dissemination requirement with respect to (i) a press release issued in Japan and posted on its
corporate website by translating the document into English, releasing it in the U.S., and posting the
translation on its corporate website, and (ii) documents mailed to holders in Japan by sending English
translations of such documents either directly to U.S. shareholders or the U.S. shareholders’ standing
agents (jonin-dairinin) in Japan.

173

See Cross Border Release, at 61,394.
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execution of the merger agreement; (ii) notice of the shareholders meeting, including any
description of the transaction and related disclosure as to the offeror’s securities; (iii)
notice of the results of the shareholders meeting; (iv) public notice published in Japan
announcing the results of the shareholders meeting and instructing shareholders how to
submit shares or any similar letter of transmittal; (v) request for submission of share
certificates in conjunction with the share exchange; and (vi) merger report made available
at the home office and posted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Web site following the share
exchange.
(vi)

Form CB and Form F-X Filing Deadlines

Informational documents must be furnished to the SEC on Form CB by the first
business day after the date of publication or dissemination.174 The entity furnishing the
Form CB must also file a Form F-X, which serves as an appointment of an agent for
service of process in the U.S. in connection with an action by the SEC.175

174

See § 230.802(a)(3)(i).

175

By appointing an agent for service of process in the U.S., the filer agrees that the SEC may commence
any proceeding by service of process (or notice) upon such agent. The agent for service of process
may be any person located in the U.S., such as a corporate services company or an affiliate of the
issuer.
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(vii)

Legends

Any informational document distributed to U.S. holders must bear a legend as set
forth in Rule 802(b).176 Where appropriate, informational documents disseminated to
U.S. holders may include a further legend making clear that the document does not itself
constitute an offering of securities in the U.S.
(3)

The Cross Border Rules - Tender Offers

Tier I and II provide limited relief from the tender offer rules for bidders seeking
to acquire the shares of a foreign private issuer through a cash tender offer or exchange
offer.
(i)

Tier I

Tier I exempts bidders seeking to acquire the securities of a foreign private issuer
with U.S. security holders through a tender offer177 from most of the Exchange Act tender
offer rules, subject to certain conditions.178

176

See § 230.802(b).

177

The “tender offer” includes exchange offers. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(b) (2004).

178

See § 240.14d-1(c). Specifically, Tier I exempts the bidder from complying with Sections 14(d)(1)
through 14(d)(7) of the Exchange Act, Regulation 14D and the attendant procedural, disclosure and
dissemination requirements, Schedule TO, Rule 14e-1 regarding the conduct of the offer, Rule 14e-2
regarding the dissemination of the target company’s position with respect to the offer, and Rule 14e-5
prohibiting purchases outside of the tender offer. It should be noted that since Sections 14(d)(1)
through 14(d)(7), Regulation 14D and Schedule TO are only applicable to transactions in which the
target company has shares registered in the U.S., in the context of a tender offer for a Japanese
company, the only benefit of Tier I is usually the release from Rules 14e-1, 14e-2 and 14e-5.
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•

10% Ownership. The Tier I exemption is only available where fewer than
10% of the class of shares sought in the bid are held by U.S. persons, subject
to the same conditions and exceptions as the Rule 802 10% ownership test. 179
Provided not more than 10% of the target company’s securities are held by
U.S. holders when a bidder commences an offer, a competing offeror need not
abide the 10% U.S. ownership requirement.180 In the case of a tender offer by
a bidder other than an affiliate of the target company (e.g., a hostile bidder),
the target company is deemed to be a foreign private issuer and the 10% or
less of the shares subject to the tender offer are deemed to be owned by U.S.
persons unless: (i) the tender offer is made pursuant to an agreement between
the bidder and the target company; (ii) the aggregate trading volume of the
targeted securities in the U.S. for the 12 month period ending 30 days before
the commencement of the offer exceeds 10% of the worldwide aggregate
trading volume of such securities over the same period; (iii) the target
company’s annual report indicates 10% or more of the targeted securities are

Transactions falling within the Tier I exemption are also not required to comply with the rules
regarding going private transactions and issuer self tenders. See §§ 240.13e-3(g)(6), 240.13e-4(h)(8).
179

See § 240.14d-1(c)(1).

180

See id.
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owned by U.S. holders; or (iv) the bidder otherwise knows 10% or more of the
targeted securities are owned by U.S. holders.181
•

Filing Requirements. Similar to Rule 802, bidders must furnish English
translations of the offering materials on Form CB, file a Form F-X consent to
service, and provide U.S. security holders with the tender offer circular and
other offering documents in English on a comparable basis to that provided to
other security holders.182 However, bidders are only required to submit Form
CB and Form F-X if the target company shares are registered under the
Exchange Act or the bidder is making a self tender.183

•

Equal Treatment - Cash Alternative. Once again in keeping with the
requirements under Rule 802, the Tier I exemption requires bidders to allow
U.S. holders to participate in the transaction on terms at least as favorable as
those offered to other holders and permits the bidder to offer U.S. holders a
cash alternative where securities are part of the consideration.184 This method
of remitting cash to U.S. holders allows bidders to include U.S holders in the
tender offer without registering the shares in the U.S. or relying on the Rule

181

See § 240.14d-1(c), Instruction 3.

182

See § 240.14d-1(c)(3).

183

See § 240.14d-1(c)(3)(iii); § 240.13e-4(h)(8)(iii)(A).

184

See § 240.14d-1(c)(2)(iii).

72
Doing Deals in Japan.doc

802 registration exemption. Nonetheless, in the case of exchange offers
Japanese law precludes forcing a group of shareholders to accept cash
consideration when other shareholders are offered securities.185
(ii)

Tier II

Tier II provides more limited relief to the tender offer requirements where a
bidder makes an offer for the securities of a foreign private issuer and more than 10% but
fewer than 40% of the securities of the target are held by U.S. persons.186 Under the Tier
II exemption, the bidder must make filings ordinarily required by the tender offer rules
and comply with certain procedural rules,187 but is granted leeway with respect to the
manner in which the tender offer is conducted so as to minimize or eliminate conflicts
with home jurisdiction law.188 There is no Form CB or F-X filing requirement for Tier II

185

See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 3.

186

See § 240.14d-1(d).

187

In particular, the bidder is required to comply with the disclosure requirements of Regulations 14D
and 14E (and Rule 13e-3 or 13e-4 relating to going private transactions and issuer tender offers,
respectively, if applicable) and must file a Schedule TO with the SEC and provide notice of the offer
to the target company’s shareholders. Moreover, since greater than 10% of the target company’s
securities are held by U.S. persons, any securities offered as part of the consideration will not be
exempt from registration pursuant to Rule 802. Therefore, any such securities must be registered with
the SEC and a prospectus must be delivered to the target company’s shareholders.

188

See § 240.14d-1(d). Pursuant to Tier II, the bidder may make different offers to U.S. and non-U.S.
holders provided the value of the consideration is consistent with the equal treatment principle, and
the bidder is subject to the notice of extension and prompt payment requirements stipulated in its
home jurisdiction tender offer rules rather than the U.S. tender offer rules. See § 240.14d-1(d)(2)(ii)(iv).
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because the rule does not exempt bidders from filing the standard tender offer disclosure
documents.
(iii)

Regulation 14E

Tender offers for the shares of a foreign private issuer with no securities
registered under the Exchange Act, which is likely to be the case for a Japanese target
company, need only comply with Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act189 and Regulation
14E. Therefore, bidders for the securities of Japanese issuers not listed in the U.S. who
are unable to take advantage of Tier I can nonetheless comply with U.S. securities laws
without a substantial burden. The primary Regulation 14E requirements for bidders are
that the offer must be kept open for 20 business days, the offer must remain open for 10
business days following a change in the number or percentage of securities sought or the
amount of consideration offered, and the bidder must provide notice of any extension of
the offer to investors and promptly pay the offered consideration or return the tendered
securities upon termination or withdrawal of the offer.190

189

Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act prohibits fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in
connection with tender offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).

190

See § 240.14e-1(a), (b), (c), (d). In addition, Regulation 14E prohibits the (i) trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information relating to the tender offer during the tender offer and
communications by the transaction parties that could result in such trading, see § 240.14e-3, (ii)
tender of shares in which the tender offeror has a short position, see § 240.14e-4, (iii) purchase of
securities by the offeror outside of the tender offer (subject to certain exceptions), see § 240.14e-5,
and (iv) announcement of an offer where the offeror (a) does not anticipate commencing and
completing the transaction within a reasonable time, (b) intends to use the announcement to
manipulate the target company share price or (c) does not have a reasonable belief it will complete the
transaction, see § 240.14e-8. Moreover, Rule 14e-2 requires that within 10 business days of the
commencement of the offer that the target company announce its position with respect to the offer.
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(4)

Emerging Issues: Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Japanese
Rights Plans

As discussed previously, Japanese companies have reacted to the increase in
hostile takeover activity by adopting various types of rights plans. However, Japanese
companies with U.S. security holders are required to comply with U.S. securities laws
when issuing shares to U.S. persons pursuant to a rights plan. Under a typical trust pill,
for instance, the company issues share purchase warrants to the trust which are
exercisable at a nominal price and are distributed to company shareholders in the event of
a hostile takeover bid. The Securities Act does not require warrants distributed under a
rights plan to be registered because such issuance does not involve an “offer” or “sale.”
However, the Securities Act requires the registration of shares issued to U.S. holders
upon the payment of a share purchase warrant exercise price unless either an exemption
from registration exists or the issuance of shares does not involve an offer or sale.
Accordingly, while the issuance of Japanese rights plans does not give rise to a
registration requirement, the possible exercise of share purchase warrants under such
rights plans will involve issues under the U.S. securities laws that should be considered as
part of the overall transaction in question.

In most tender offers for the securities of a Japanese company, the target publicly disseminates an
opinion regarding the offer.
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(5)

Consequences for Failure to Comply with the Cross Border Rules
and Informational Document Liability

The Securities Act provides that an issuer must either file a registration statement
with the SEC or comply with an exemption from registration before publicly offering
securities in the U.S. Therefore, if an issuer offers or sells securities in the U.S. without
either registering such securities or complying with Rule 802 or another exemption, the
issuer will be in violation of U.S. securities laws regardless of the number of persons to
whom the offer is made.
Failure to provide informational documents on Form CB or disseminate them to
U.S. holders would constitute a failure to comply with the Rule 802 exemption. As a
result, the exemption would not be available to issue stock in the U.S. The subsequent
issuance of stock without the benefit of registration or another exemption would result in
violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act. This violation could give rise to a civil
enforcement action by the SEC,191 and would give U.S. investors a right of rescission
with regard to the shares received in the exchange.192 Moreover, the SEC could seek an
injunction from a U.S. federal district court prohibiting the issuer from including U.S.
holders in the offer,193 and as a result of a civil enforcement action such a court could

191

See 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1997).

192

See § 77l.

193

See § 77h-1.
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impose monetary penalties.194 Individuals found to have willfully violated Section 5
could face additional fines and imprisonment.195 If an issuer willfully disregards U.S.
securities laws, the likelihood and severity of fines would increase. Bidders would face
similar consequences for failure to comply with provisions of the Exchange Act in the
context of a tender offer.196
If an issuer is only late in filing or disseminating a document, it is unlikely the
SEC would take the view that the transaction does not fall within the Cross Border Rules
unless the information not disseminated materially impaired security holders’ ability to
make an investment decision. Indeed, pursuant to the SEC’s recent guidelines regarding
financial penalties, remedial steps taken by the corporation to protect investors militate
against the assessment of fines.197
Companies that furnish informational documents to the SEC on Form CB are not
subject to liability for false or misleading statements made within documents filed with
the SEC pursuant to Section 18 of the Exchange Act because documents furnished on

194

See § 77t(d)(2). Monetary penalties range from $5,000 to $50,000 or the “gross amount of pecuniary
gain” resulting from the wrongful action for individuals and $50 to $500,000 or the “gross amount of
pecuniary gain” resulting from the wrongful action for entities. See id.

195

See § 77x. Individuals found to have willfully violated the Securities Act may be fined up to $10,000
or imprisoned for up to 5 years.

196

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u.

197

See SEC News Digest, Issue 2006-02, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2005), http://sec.gov/news/digest/dig010406.txt (hereinafter
“Statement Concerning Financial Penalties”).
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Form CB are not deemed “filed.”198 Nonetheless, companies may be subject to liability
for material misstatements or omissions contained in informational documents furnished
on Form CB under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, which subjects companies to
liability for making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.199
Individuals and entities face significant fines, criminal penalties and private lawsuits for
10b-5 violations.200 Liability under Rule 10b-5 requires proof of scienter as an element
of the cause of action, which requires knowing or reckless conduct.201

198

See § 78r.

199

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).

200

10b-5 violations can give rise to civil enforcement actions by the SEC. See § 78u (criminal
prosecution); § 78ff (private action for damages). In the context of a civil enforcement action by the
SEC, individuals can be fined between $5,000 and $100,000 or the “gross amount of pecuniary gain”
resulting from the wrongful action. See § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i). Entities can be fined between $50,000 and
$500,000 or the “gross amount of pecuniary gain” resulting from the wrongful action. See §
78u(d)(3)(B)(ii). The SEC also has the authority to apply to enjoin any further violation of the
Securities Act, see § 78u(d)(1), and prohibit an individual to act as a director of a company with
securities registered under the Exchange Act, see § 78u(d)(2). 10b-5 violators could also face
criminal prosecution, which caries a maximum penalty of $5,000,000 and 20 years in prison for
individuals and $25,000,000 for entities. See § 78ff(a). Pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where
the SEC obtains a judgment under the securities laws or reaches a settlement agreement for the
disgorgement of funds and also obtains a civil judgment, the civil judgment can be added to the
disgorgement funds held for the benefit of the victims of the securities law violation. See 15 U.S.C. §
7246(a) (2006).

201

See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (finding scienter or “a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” a prerequisite to 10b-5 liability); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (finding
recklessness sufficient to create 10b-5 liability).
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To date, the SEC has not conducted a civil enforcement action in the context of a
business combination or tender offer involving a foreign private issuer with a small
number of U.S. holders who failed to take advantage of, or improperly utilized Rule 802
or Tier I or II. However, the SEC’s Statement Concerning Financial Penalties suggests
that the SEC would impose civil penalties should it detect a foreign private issuer’s
failure to comply with the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. The SEC’s primary
considerations are whether the company in question benefited from its wrongful acts and
whether a penalty will compensate or harm injured shareholders.202 Some of the factors
that weigh in favor of the assessment of civil penalties are intent to circumvent the law,
the difficulty in detecting the offense which calls for “an especially high level of
deterrence,” and the absence of remedial action and the lack of cooperation with the
SEC.203 Moreover, the SEC and FSA recently announced terms of an agreement for
increased cooperation and collaboration, the objectives of which are “to identify and
discuss regulatory issues of common concern, and promote cooperation in the exchange
of information in cross-border enforcement matters.”204 The SEC – FSA agreement

202

See Statement Concerning Financial Penalties.

203

See id. Similarly, the SEC’s previous guidance on the subject emphasized the importance of selfpolicing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation with the SEC. See Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the
Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
44969, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement, Release No. 14780 (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (commonly referred to as the “Seaboard Report”).

204

Press Release, SEC 2006-14, SEC and Japan Financial Services Agency Announce Terms for
Increased Cooperation and Collaboration (Jan 30, 2006), http://sec.gov/news/press/2006-14.htm.
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reflects a global trend of international cooperation in securities law enforcement.205
Therefore, despite the absence of past SEC action relating to Japanese transactions, the
current climate of international regulatory cooperation makes clear that compliance with
U.S. securities laws should be a key concern when doing Japanese deals.
F.

Additional Strategic Considerations

In addition to the aforementioned issues that should be taken into account when
engaging in Japanese deals, there are a few other practical issues that may be helpful to
keep in mind throughout the negotiations with a Japanese company. Cultural differences
are always a challenge when doing a cross-border deal, but even beyond the ubiquitous
differences in negotiation styles and societal norms there are often certain methods and
approaches in which successful Japanese deals are done. In a given transaction, this may
include some or all of the following factors.

205

See, e.g., Press Release, SEC 2004-116, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the “Shell” Transport
and Trading Company, P.L.C. Pay $120 Million to Settle SEC Fraud Case Involving Massive
Overstatement of Proved Hydrocarbon Reserves (Aug. 24, 2004), http://sec.gov/news/press/2004116.htm. The SEC, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority and the Dutch Autoriteit
Financiële Markten jointly pursued the investigation of Shell’s overstatement, and the $120 million
settlement was made in conjunction with a £17 million settlement with the UK FSA. See also Press
Release, SEC 2005-1, SEC Charges TV Azteca And Its Chairman—Ricardo Salinas Pliego—with
Fraudulent Scheme to Conceal Salinas’ $109 Million Windfall Through Related Party Transactions
(Jan. 4, 2005), http://sec.gov/news/press/2005-1.htm (discussing the cooperation between the SEC and
the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores in Mexico); SEC Litigation Release No. 18527, SEC
Charges Parmalat with Financial Fraud (Dec. 30, 2003), http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18527.
htm (discussing the cooperation between the SEC and the Italian Commissione Nazionale per la
Società e la Borsa); and Press Release, SEC 2003-184, Commission Settles Civil Fraud Action
Against Vivendi Universal, S.A., its Former CEO, Jean-Marie Messier, and its Former CFO,
Guillaume Hannezo (Dec. 23, 2003), http://sec.gov/news/press/2003-184.htm (discussing the
cooperation between the SEC and the French Autorité des Marches Financiers).
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(1)

Practical Difficulties for the Hostile Deal

Although the number of hostile and contested deals in Japan has increased of late,
it should be noted that friendly deals are still the norm. The approximate success rate of
hostile deals in the U.S. is 35% and in Europe is 50%.206 In Japan, however, there have
been few instances in the past decade where a hostile acquirer has eventually succeeded
in obtaining control of a Japanese company.207 Moreover, as more Japanese companies
adopt rights plans and the rules on permissible defensive measures become clearer, it is
likely that the acquirer will at some point need to enter into serious negotiations with the
target company—the risks of going “all in” on a tender offer or proxy contest should
probably be the gamble of last resort.
There are a number of reasons why this may be the case. For instance, the
acquirer will probably not have sufficient information as part of the due diligence process
to be able to determine with confidence what its top line should be for a possible
acquisition. While Japanese companies provide some information in their filings with
206

See THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY REPORT, at 11.

207

In 1999, Cable & Wireless succeeded in its hostile tender offer for IDC shares despite NTT’s friendly
tender offer. Prior to the tender offer, Cable & Wireless was a 17.69% shareholder of IDC. In 2000,
Boehringer Ingelheim succeeded in its tender offer for SS Pharmaceutical shares, even though SS
Pharmaceutical did not expressly approve the tender offer and remained silent on the issue.
Boehringer Ingelheim was a 19.6% shareholder of SS Pharmaceutical before launching the tender
offer. However, note that in a recent hostile deal involving Origin Toshu Co. Ltd. (the target
company), Don Quijote Co., Ltd. (the hostile bidder) decided to sell its shares in the target to Aeon
Co., Ltd. (a white knight) even though Don Quijote acquired approximately 47.8% of the target shares
through market purchases. See The Yomiuri Shimbun, Don Quiyote, Aeon TOB Oubo Top Kaidan de
Taio Tenkan [Don Quijote accepted Aeon’s tender offer. It changed its approach after a senior
management meeting], February 27, 2006, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/mnews/20060227
mh06.htm (last visited on March 19, 2006).
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Japanese securities regulators, such as summaries of material contracts, the amount of
disclosure is not as extensive as would be the case for a company that is subject to
Exchange Act reporting requirements.208 In cases where the hostile deal may involve
competition law issues under the Anti-Monopoly Law, it could be difficult to perform a
market share analysis without the cooperation of the target company. Finally, the recent
investigations into the accounting practices of Livedoor could mean that target companies
and their investors will react more defensively to hostile bids than would otherwise be the
case in the absence of Livedoor’s alleged accounting fraud.209 Therefore, the preferred
approach in Japanese deals remains to be friendly first, and then negotiate in earnest on
those matters that the acquirer considers its vital business interests.

208

For example, it is rare to find an explanation regarding change-of-control provisions in Japanese
securities filings. The instructions for securities reports under the Securities and Exchange Law
provides “if the company has entered into a material business agreement such as a lease or
management consignment agreement of all or a material part of its business, an agreement that the
company shares all business profits and losses with others, technical support agreements and so on,
such agreements must be disclosed in an outline format.” Kigyonaiyoto no Kaiji ni kansuru
Naikakufurei [Cabinet Order regarding Disclosure of Business Contents and Others], Financial
Ministry Order No. 5 of 1973, form 3, note (12); form 2, note (33).

209

On January 16, 2006, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office began an investigation into
Livedoor’s possible violation of the Securities and Exchange Law in connection with its M&A
activities and allegedly fraudulent accounting practices. In the days thereafter, Livedoor’s share price
took a beating—dropping from a closing price of 696 yen on January 16, 2006 to a closing price of 61
yen on February 13, 2006. On March 13, 2006, the Tokyo Stock Exchange announced Livedoor’s
delisting. Since the Livedoor – Fuji Television transaction is regarded as a symbol of the hostile deal,
with the former Livedoor CEO Takefumi Horie as the pubic face of the hostile acquirer, future
acquirers of Japanese companies should carefully consider whether such a climate will be conducive
to certain offensive M&A strategies.
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(2)

Obtaining “Corporate Value” in the Acquisition

The Defensive Measures Guidelines provide that “defensive measures should be
adopted, activated and cancelled for purposes to secure and increase corporate value, and
in turn work to the shareholders’ common benefit.”210 Furthermore, the Corporate Value
Study Report notes that an acquisition proposal which will increase corporate value
should not be excluded.211 The concern over better understanding and assessing
“corporate value” is an issue that an acquirer will probably confront in some manner
when negotiating a Japanese deal. In this regard, it should be noted that corporate value
does not necessarily mean only the temporal interests of the company shareholders, but
also the long-term effects that a possible acquisition could have on the company. The
Defensive Measures Guidelines define corporate value as “a company’s attributes and the
degree thereto that contribute to the shareholders’ benefit such as the company’s assets,
profitability, stability, efficiency, growth potentialand so forth .”212 Such a principle is
not foreign to Delaware takeovers jurisprudence.213 Accordingly, the acquirer would
serve itself well by appreciating the importance of obtaining corporate value in order to
achieve a successful Japanese deal.
210

See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 3.

211

See THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY REPORT, at 83.

212

See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 2.

213

“[T]he directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to determine that the market
undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long term value
of the corporation under its present management plan.” Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995).
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(3)

Defining the Acquisition Proposal

As mentioned in the discussion of the Yumeshin – JEC deal, a Japanese target
company will probably require that an acquirer provide sufficient information on its
proposed acquisition. From the perspective of the target, such information is necessary in
order to evaluate the potential impact of the proposed acquisition on corporate value.
Thus, an acquirer should anticipate that the process of completing such procedures may
take more time than it is accustomed to when compared to similar transactions in the
United States. Furthermore, there is the likelihood that the target company will respond
to an unsolicited acquirer by noting that any information provided by such acquirer is
insufficient. In the Yumeshin – JEC deal, JEC insisted that Yumeshin announced its
tender offer without providing JEC with sufficient information.214 As you may recall,
however, the Tokyo District Court suggested that JEC could have obtained the necessary
information by responding to Yumeshin’s proposal of a business alliance.215 The
acquirer, therefore, should use its best efforts to provide as much information as possible
in such situations, and be open to negotiations with the target company.

214

See JEC, TOSHA KABUSHIKI NI TAISURU KOKAIKAITSUKE KETSUGI HE NO TAIO NI TSUITE [Re:
Reaction to Resolution of Tender Offer for Shares of the Company], 1 (July 11, 2005), available at
http://www.jecc.co.jp/topics/kaituke_3.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).

215

See supra note 49.
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IV.

Conclusion
The current Japanese M&A market presents opportunities for U.S. companies and

their advisors that are arguably the most promising in recent history. Perhaps an
important observation to keep in mind, however, is that Japanese M&A is experiencing
historic changes for which the full effects will probably only be completely appreciated
in hindsight. While one can note the changes on a play-by- play basis, the ultimate
outcomes of various transactions, tender offers, and proxy contests can only be known
with certainty after their completion. To draw a parallel to the U.S. experience with
takeovers, Japan in 2006 may well be like Delaware in 1985 shortly before the Delaware
Supreme Court issued its historic rulings in Moran,216 Unocal and Revlon. Thus, in
Japan much has happened, but more is likely coming. With this in mind, given the
challenges posed by the opportunities in the Japanese M&A market, the importance of
well informed and considered decision-making will be essential in order to ensure that
U.S. companies compete and succeed in doing Japanese deals.
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Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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